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Through historical and comparative analysis this study demonstrates how
and why an agrarian system has been reproduced in modem China and how that
legacy strongly influences post-revolutionary political structure and ideology. The
agrarian legacy also helps explain China's difficulty in establishing a capitalist
market structure, an industrialized economy, and a more democratic political
system. The analysis draws heavily upon recent work by Lenski, Lenski, and
Nolan (1991) on ecological evolutionary theory.
A primary source of evidence in this research is my own personal
experience as a native of China. Other sources include: comparative data for
agrarian societies from Murdock and White's (1969) Standard Cross°Cultural
Sample (SCCS), Tuden and Marshall's (1972) political organizational codes for
the societies in the SCCS, and a number of literary and historical documents.
This research begins with an examination of the political structure and
ideology of imperial China. The analysis shows that throughout its long history
China has clearly demonstrated political and ideological features consistent with
other agrarian societies.

Second, this research illustrates that Maoism as a

dominant ideology" in modem China served a similar function as Confucianism
in imperial China. These ideologies (Maoism and Confucianism) validated the
political power of China's emperors and ruling class.

Ideological currents and

the agrarian legacy have significantly slowed the development of rational-legal

vii
authority. So while China has demonstrated economic growth and industrialization, it has not developed a commensurate political and economic structure as
predicted, for example, by the theories of Max Weber (1947). Third, this study
explores "the second revolution" (Harding 1986) of post-Maoist China to reform
its political and economic structure toward a more rational-legal form.
This study finds that the Chinese polity has l)een slow to achieve rationallegal forms that characterize the polities of the advanced industrial societies
because China's technological base remains largely agrarian. It also fmds that
current political economic reforms in post-Maoist China continue to press for
economic growth and development but remain conservative in promoting political
change so as to maintain a tight social order.

IBtimately, I believe that

industrialization, changes in the demographics of the labor force, and economic
growth will eventually produce broader changes in the political system. Political
liberalization and more democratic political institutions will come to China, but
gradually as a result of increasing industrialization.
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Introduction

The Problem
This study will show that Imperial China was a classic agrarian society. It
will argue that the agrarian political structure and ideology have been reproduced
in post-revolutionary China. Also I consider the ways in which traditional and
charismatic authority of the agrarian polity has begun to change toward one based
on more rational-legal principles in recent China.
One key to understanding contemporary Chinese political structure and
ideology is to view them in terms of the legacies of imperial China's polity
founded in B.C. 221. More than two thousand years of traditional bureaucracy
is finnly rooted in Chinese political structure.

Even though the Chinese

Communist Party has held power since 1949, it has still, in most respects,
continued the imperial tradition; and traditional Chinese political ideology has
been reproduced in an altered symbolic form.

Whether it was the imperial

emperor or the Communist paramount leaders, all considered that the dominant
ideology played an indispensable function to keep social harmony and stability.
One insisted on Confucianism, the other upholds Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought.
Both deeply feared that change would bring about social chaos. To some extent,
there was no Chinese revolution, but only another traditional bureaucratic
restoration with new elements.
Therefore, it is important to know the characteristics of imperial Chinese
political structure which are based on the typical features of agrarian society.
Also, we should realize how important it has become for Chinese Communist
government to adopt pragmatic policies and new structures in order to modernize
its national economy. Under this situation, an interesting question is how post-

2

· Maoist China gradually refonns its traditional and charismatic authority structures
toward a more rational-legal authority.
In this study, I will adhere to the following questions and themes:
L

Traditional . agrarian China may reveal more about social order and

political stability than any other society. The Chinese imperial system was the
most enduring major political system in world history. What are the fundamental
factors which allowed this "pennanent dynastic system" to survive?
2.

As an advanced, highly developed agrarian society, why is it that imperial

China could create a great integrated political bureaucracy in its early history?
Why did it stagnate at that level?
3.

Although a dramatic revolution occurred in China to smash the imperial

political structure, why does post-revolutionary China still reflect traditional
legacies?

Why do the agrarian "remnants" still exert a strong influence on

contemporary China?
4.

What factors explain an under-developed and inefficient bureaucratic

system in China? How can post-Maoist China face the rapidly changing world
and refonn its political and economic system toward a more rational-legal fonn?

5.

Ideology has always played an indispensable function in Chinese political

life, both in the imperial era's Confucianism and in post-revolutionary China's
Maoism and "four principles". How do these dominant ideologies work in the
political structure?
"AgrarianSociety" As a Theoretical Construct
This study depends upon the method of political sociology--the sociological
study of political processes and political systems (Eisenstadt 1971). It seeks to
describe and explicate the characteristics of agrarian societies, and to analyze the
development and change of the Chinese polity from the imperial era to
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contemporary times. To accomplish this it relies on Lenski's model of "agrarian
society" and "industrializing agrarian society" to explain why post-revolutionary
China has inherited the agrarian polity of the imperial era. Therefore it discusses
how the agrarian legacy still strongly influences Chinese political structure and
the ideology of post-revolutionary China.

1.

Typology of societies based upon subsistence technology
Most human societies have changed little during their course of existence.

But it is clear that some societies have grown substantially, some have shifted
from a nomadic way of life to permanent settlements in villages, and some have
shifted from a predominantly rural mode of life to a predominantly urban one.
Such changes have usually been accompanied by important changes in social
organization, such as substantial increases in organizational complexity, the
division oflabor, and social inequality. In short, some societies have experienced
a process of substantial growth and development while others have not (Lenski
et al. 1991, p. 60).
According to Lenski, production technology plays the most critical part in
societal growth and development, because "an advance in subsistence technology
is a necessary precondition for a significant increase in the size and complexity
of a society", and "technology defines the limits of what is possible for a society"
(Lenski et al. 1991, p. 60). On the basis of subsistence technology, the patterns
of social organization change.

The different types of political structure and

ideology of societies are also influenced by production technology. Arguing in
this way leads Lenski to classify human societies based upon their subsistence
technologies.

In accordance with their primary mode of subsistence, human

societies are divided into ten basic categories (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 70):
Hunting and gathering societies
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Simple horticultural societies
Advanced horticultural societies
Simple agrarian societies
Advanced agrarian societies
Fishing societies
Maritime societies
Simple herding societies
Advanced herding societies
Industrial societies
"A society is classified as a hunting and gathering society
only if the hunting of wild animals and foraging for uncultivated
plant foods are its primary means of subsistence. Horticultural
societies are societies which practice farming, but do not have
plows. Agrarian societies engage in farming, but they use plows.
Advanced agrarian societies use iron tools and weapons, while
simple agrarian societies have only copper and bronze, which are
softer metals and less plentiful" (Lenski et al. 1991, pp. 70-1).
Fishing, herding, and maritime societies are different from the other types
of societies in that they are environmentally specialized types, although the
development of these societies still depended on their subsistence technologies.
Industrial societies are the newest type of society and technologically the
most advanced.

The distinguishing feature of these societies is their heavy

dependence on machine technology and inanimate sources of energy. Because
of their highly advanced technology, industrial societies are the most powerful and
productive societies the world has seen to date. This situation determines the
difference between pre-industrial societies and industrial societies.
It is important to point out that not all societies fit neatly into the ten
types of societies mentioned above. Some are hybrids that combine in roughly
equal proportions the characteristics of two or more of the basic types. Lenski
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considers, often--though not always--that hybrid societies are in a state of
transition form one mode of production to another and from one level of
development to another. Therefore, many lesser-developed societies today are
beginning to industrialize.

But they still depend heavily on preindustrial

technology, which also determines their social, political, and economic structures.
Some of these can be characterized as industrializing agrarian societies.

2.

General political and ideological features of agrarian society
In nearly all advanced agrarian societies, government was the basic

integrating force. Coercion was necessary to hold things together and maintain
the benefit of a tiny elite. It was important to agrarian societies to have a strong
military force. Most advanced agrarian societies had a monarchy headed by a
king or emperor whose position was usually hereditary.

"Agrarian rulers and

governing classes saw nothing immoral in the use of what we (not they) would
call 'public office' for private gain. To them, it was simply the legitimate use of

their 'patrimony'" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 78).
The king or emperor naturally wanted the greatest possible control over
his subordinates, so he held supreme authority.

Another faction in advanced

agrarian societies was an authoritarian bureaucracy shot through with kinship ties,
nepotism, and favoritism. Thus, bureaucracy was another indispensable faction
in the agrarian polity and it deeply influenced the political process in nearly every
agrarian society. An excellent case study is Antonio's ''Authoritarian Bureaucracy

in Ancient Rome " (1986). It clearly illustrates the characteristic_s of an advanced
agrarian society. Rome, through its bureaucracy, organized the society into a
structure of extraction and coercion, but this also generated responses from
below. An elaborate network of patron-client relationships provided means to
avert extraction and arbitrary impositions of power. A dynamic of state control
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and clientelistic adjustment resulted.
From ancient Rome's example, we find that the state apparatus was small
and highly personal.

Unlike modem governmental bureaucracy, appointment,

advancement, and day-to-day functioning depended largely on personal loyalty
derived from familial, friendship, and dependency relations. Offices were created
in an ad hoc manner, lacked legal jurisdiction, and did not usually require special
training.

Political structural differentiation was part of a broader process of

centralization that concentrated complete power in the hands of the emperor
(Antonio 1986). This kind of bureaucracy built upon and perpetuated a complex,
vertical class and status hierarchy. A similar situation can be found in imperial
China.
Furthermore, the Roman emperor relied on the high aristocracy for
political support, advisors, and official appointees. Beneath the high aristocracy
was the curial order (decurious) who occupied positions on prestigious city
councils (municipal senates) and held the important magistracies. In imperial
China, royal family members, eunuchs, and certain levels of literati composed a
similar hierarchical structure.
The patron-client relationship (patronage or clientelism) became the key
link of the authoritarian

bureaucracy of ancient Rome.

It was based on

submission and loyalty, extraction and mutual assistance.

Clients served their

patron and received protection and assistance in return.

Patrons represented

their clients in court, provided them subsistence, or exerted influence to promote
their careers. Patronage promoted stable domination by establishing bonds and
reciprocities that cut across the vertical class and status hierarchies. Patronage
was the basis of official appointment because everything was done 'from above'
and people had to depend upon their allies (Antonio 1986).

The emperor

appointed his 'friends' and clients, who in tum appointed their 'friends' and
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clients. The network of patron-client alliances suffused the bureaucracy and the
wider society. Finally, since promotion reflected patronage networks, this skewed
the appointment process strongly toward loyalty and personalism, and away from
uniform emphasis on professional training, merit, seniority, specialization, and
legal jurisdiction (Saller 1980; Cotton 1981; see Antonio 1986, p. 30).
These features match Udy's characterization of "informal organization"--a
type of traditional organizational hierarchy that departs significantly from Weber's
ideal-typical bureal)cracy (Udy 1959). The features of authoritarian bureaucracy
of ancient Rome exhibited many informal arrangements, such as lack legal
jurisdiction, personalism, patrimonialism, nepotism, clientelism, etc. The informal
characteristics of the authoritarian bureaucracy reflected characteristics of the
wider agrarian society: the dispersed economic resource base with relatively
inefficient transportation and communications, the huge peasant population, and
the lack of resources to finance a more formalized bureaucracy (Antonio 1986).
This situation is still found within industrializing agrarian societies.
The ideology of agrarian societies was founded upon the universal faiths,
which played an indispensable function in maintaining societal unity, such as
Buddhism in South F.ast Asia, Confucianism in China, and Christianity in Europe.
Religion offered ruling dynasties a strong basis to legitimate their supreme power.
For example, the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of Kings' prevailed in European
countries prior to the industrial era, and the Roman emperor was worshiped as
god. Eisenstdat calls this kind of ideology a "totalistic ideology" (1966, p. 105).
"In advanced agrarian society, the single most important
consequence of an increase in economic surplus was further growth
of the state and in the power of the governing class that controlled
it. This contributed, directly or indirectly, to most of the other
important social and cultural changes of the agrarian era. It lay
behind the shift from militia to professional armies; the increase in
inequality, and the development of ideologies justifying inequality
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and the power of elites; the rise of the merchant class and the
increase in trade and commerce; the growth of urban populations;
the increase in the division of labor; and the slowing of the rate of
innovation" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 200).
In a word, the agrarian subsistence technology determined social evolution
and development.

It also determined the characteristics of agrarian polity and

ideology (see chart 1).

Chart 1. The Relationship Between Subsistence Technology and Agrarian Polity
Agrarian Subsistence
determined
Technology:
plow agriculture
large rural population <
low productive force
based on

3.

Agrarian Polity:
sovereign emperor or king
traditional,charismatic authority
centralized executive force
strong police,military function
patrimonialism,clientelism
totalistic ideology

The transition to industrializing agrarian societies

Despite the rapid spread of industrialization during the last two centuries,
less than a quarter of the world's population lives in societies that can be
considered highly industrialized. The great majority, however, do live in societies
that have been substantially altered as a consequence of the diffusion of modem
industrial technology. These hybrid societies are best described as industrializing

societies---the ones commonly referred to as the developing nations of the Third
World (Lenski et al. 1991). Many of these nations are in a transitional phase,
moving from an agrarian way of life to a modem industrial O!].e. The industrializing agrarian societies (including China, India, countries in the Middle East,
Latin American, and Eastern Europe) combine elements of both the agrarian

past and the industrial present.
In industrializing agrarian societies, one of the greatest hindrances to
development has been the kind of governing class they inherited from the past.
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This class enjoyed a privileged status for centuries, and its members have seldom
shown any desire to change things in the twentieth century. From their perspective, change is something to be resisted, or, when possible, exploited for their
personal benefit (Lenski et al. 1991). But there are many differences among
these industrializing societies. The political systems they have developed during
this century are widely varying, some have adopted the model of Western industri
al democracy, others have followed the model of socialism or communism.
In my presentation, I will use Lenski's model sketched above to analyze
how the Chinese case falls into his model of "agrarian society" and "industrializing
agrarian society".
Sources of Evidence

A primary source of evidence is my own personal experience as a native
Chinese from Sichuan province. I will also use a number of secondary sources,
books, articles, etc which describe imperial and contemporary China.

Some

comparative data for agrarian societies come from Murdock and White's (1969)
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) and Tuden and Marshall's (1972)
political organizational codes for the societies in the SCCS.
Plan of the Study

This study is divided into three parts. In the first part, the Ideology and
Political Structure in Imperial China,

I will describe imperial political

characteristics and show how these relate to the typical features of an agrarian
polity. In the second part, Post-Revolutionary China, I will discuss how the
political structure of modem China resembles that of the Imperial era. I will also
emphasize the dominant ideology of Maoism and the political rituals that helped
to sustain it.

Concluding this part I discuss the inefficiency of the Chinese
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political structure· and process. In part 3, China After Mao, I will illustrate how
post-Maoist China under Deng gradually reformed the political and economic
structures, but the "second revolution" of post-Maoist China still clings to an
ideological conservatism, despite Deng's pragmatism in areas of economic reform.

11

Part I Ideology and Political Structure in Imperial China
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Chapter 1 Imperial Chinese Ideology

China became an advanced agrarian society during the Qin dynasty, at
which time the hnperial system, along with its patrimonial bureaucracy, was
established. This form of government had lasted more than two thousand years.
The basic pattern of the Chinese polity over the centuries had been that of a
hereditary emperor who ruled with the help of literati, royal family members, and
eunuchs. Emperors and dynasties could be and were overthrown, to be replaced
by other emperors and other dynasties.

Continuity was preserved, however,

because from generation to generation--until the begiuning of this century--the
literati who controlled and administrated the country shared the same values as
their predecessors and were chosen in the same way (Schwartz 1965). Confuciaism provided the ideological foundation of the imperial political system; the
literati played an indispensable function to enhance and propagate Confucianism.

L

Confucianism as a dominant ideology
"Confucianism was remarkable because it was secular and was considered

valid and appropriate

for the problems of everyone--emperor,

bureaucrat,

landlord, and ordinary subject" (Pye 1978, p. 32). It spoke with authority about
the common concerns of all who, like fathers, must look after their children. It
was used as a moral code for hierarchical social relations, and served to maintain
the patrimonial order.
Confucius was primarily interested in how men might live together so there
could be peace and harmony in their society as well as their personal lives.
Confucius' teachings stressed Ren--filial piety, Li--loyalty to one's superior, and
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De--virtuous conduct. The emphasis was on good manners and ethical conduct
for rulers, officials, and the masses. The basic assumption was that the empire
was essentially a huge extended family; the emperor could be regarded as the
father, and his subjects as his children. Confucius stressed the importance of a
virtuous ruler who set a good example by saying to one monarch: "Ifyour desire
is for good, the people will be good. The moral character of the ruler is the
wind; the moral character of those beneath him is the grass. When the grass has
the wind upon it, it assuredly bends" (cited in Schwartz 1965, p. 25).
The philosophy of Confucianism, which bade the ruler deal with the mass
of the people as children, was essentially a code for the guidance of an absolute
but hopefully benevolent dictatorship.

That is why the Chinese people have

always wished for a kind and benevolent emperor or paternalistic officials until
today.

Of course, this circumstance had strong parallels with the traditional

Chinese patriarchal family system.
Confucianism was not only a systematic philosophy of state rule, but also
an attitude toward the universe and a quasi-religious system (Schwartz 1965). For
example, the emperor was considered the 'Son of Heaven'. He was believed to
be granted the right to communicate direct!y to the 'Spirit of Heaven' and to
make sacrificial rites.

Furthermore, it was the emperor's right to grant

recognition to powerful deities as objects of worship, bestowing title and rank
upon them or demoting them as the occasion demanded.

The masses, on the

other hand, led by the household patriarchs, worshiped their own ancestral spirits.
Confucianism emphasized court etiquette, state ceremonies, and proper
conduct toward one's ancestors in the famous five degrees of relationships. These
relationships

were:

father\son,

emperor\subject,

brother\younger brother, and friends\friends.

husband\wife,

older

It aimed at social harmony and

stability which was the cement that held society together and was supposed to be
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a moral consensus. The building blocks that were held together by this cement
were human bonds and mutual obligations arranged in a huge hierarchy--from
emperor and ministers down through local officials and local gentry, and finally
to the inunediate family--the bonds between emperor and official, father and son,
husband and wife, brothers, and friends (Whyte 1986).
The analogy between family and state bureaucracy
Patriarchy, patrimonialism, and filial piety were indispensable for the
Chinese bureaucracy.

While patriarchy reflected the family system per se,

patrimonialism extended the respect for authority toward the political center and
toward the emperor (Son of Heaven) who was to govern the empire as a father
governs his family. Filial piety exemplified this multilevel relationship, because
"it was a doctrine of sincere submission, a doctrine that prescribes the superiority
of the father's role, as well as the manner of obedience given to the person in
that role" (Hamilton 1990, p. 77).
It was 'Ren', 'Li' and 'De' of Confucianism that merged the patriarchal

family system and the patrimonial bureaucracy into an organic whole to form the
characteristics of the Chinese ideology.

On the basis of man's desire and

emotion, Confucianism proposed the highest moral principle 'Ren'. It described
the ethical code and established the spiritual order of interpersonal relationships.

'Ren' stands for (1) the obliteration of the individual; (2) the spirit of sacrifice;
(3) self-restraint; (4) lack of privacy and (5) ideological control (Gong Wen-xiang
1989, p. 365). The main content of 'Ren' is filial piety expressed toward parents,
elders, and superiors.

In the situation of the patriarchal family, the first

important thing is filial piety.

"Filial piety is the root of all virtue of

Confucianism. Because our bodies, in every hair and bit of skin, are received by
us from our parents, we must not venture to injure or scar them. This is the
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beginning of filial piety." (Scharfstein 1974, p. 6, cited from The Classic of Filial
Piety). When the moral order of patriarchy was applied to socio-political life, it

was defined as 'Li', described as 'the way to administer a state' or 'the norms of
appropriate

behavior according to status' .

'Li ' places the stress on the

subordinate's duty to obey, assigus role obligations that signify his or her
submission to duty, and restricts legitimate acts of power and obedience to
behaviors

in a role set (eg. father\son,

emperor\subjects,

etc.).

This

depersonalized form of patriarchy is in tum justified by the belief that it is the
duty of all individuals to conform to their roles in order to maintain the harmony
of the whole. In the bureaucracy, loyalty to the emperor and complete obedience
became cardinal principles.
By emphasizing relations between 'father\son', 'emperor\subjects', etc.,
Confucianism offered strong ideological support to the emperor as well as to the
bureaucracy with its numerous officials. As a famous philosopher Zhu Xi (AD
1130-1200) said, "Take for instance the human heart: father-son, prince-minister,
brothers, husband-wife, friends, these relationships are just naturally embedded
in it.

To deny these relationships was to deny one's own nature" (cited in

Hamilton 1990, p. 95). Another philosopher Cheng Hao (AD 1032-1085) also
pointed out that such relationships actually belong to the eternal principle of the
cosmos from which there was no escape between heaven and earth (See
Hamilton 1990, p. 95).
Patriarchy was extended to become a basic principle of political as well as
social structure. The society was seen as one vast 'extended family' ruled over by
a paternalistic emperor, the 'Son of Heaven' and other paternalistic officials.
Weber made note of this when he wrote "Just as patrimonialism has its genesis
in the piety of children of the house toward the patriarch's authority, so
Confucianism bases the subordination of the officials to the ruler, of the lower
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to the higher-ranking officials, and particularly of the subjects to the officials and
the ruler, on the cardinal virtue of filial piety" (cited in Hamilton 1990, p. 60).
This is why Weber further noted that state authority as well as family authority
in China approached the pure form, and the concept of piety, the virtue common
to all examples of patriarchy and patrimonialism, reached its highest level (cited
in Hamilton 1990, p. 61).

Therefore the legitimating ideology of the patrimonial bureaucracy was
based on the ideology of the extended patriarchical family system. So there were
strong roots of patrimonialism bred into the whole society.

Patriarchy and

patrimonialism merged to become typical characteristics of Chinese political
ideology under Confucianism (See chart 2).
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Chart 2.

The Analogy Between Family and State Bureaucracy

Patrimonial
bureaucracy

Patriarch
System
TradiConfu
tional
cian............... pa triism
archal
though

Agrarian
Economy

(Dotted

Family selfSufficient
Economy
lines

represent

relationships

based

on

analogy)
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Chapter 2 The Agrarian Polity of Imperial China

.L.

Comparison of China with other agrarian societies
To demonstrate

that the political structure of imperial and pre-

revolutionary China represents a typical agrarian polity, I have selected thirty
agrarian societies from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of preindustrial
societies to identify their common political characteristics.

Through this

comparison it will be shown that China's political characteristics fall in the modal
categories in almost every instance.
Murdock and White (1969, the data for China was collected in 1936, See
Murdock and White) selected 186 societies for their standard sample, and it
includes many types of societies including hunting and gathering, horticultural,
agrarian, and fishing and herding. Agrarian societies were distinguished from the
other types according to the following criteria: if the reliance on plow agriculture
accounted for more than 56 percent of the food consumed, or if the reliance on

plow agriculture was in the range of 46-55 percent and no other mode of food
production--such as fishing or herding--was equally important.

This coding

definition resulted in the sample of 30 agrarian societies.
Tuden and Marshall's paper "Political Organization: Cross-Cultural Codes
4" (1972) provided a detailed definition and presentation of coded variables in
order to interpret the political structure of the thirty agrarian societies.

I

determined the frequency distributions for each of the political characteristics to
find out whether or not China fell in the mode for the sample of agrarian
societies (See Appendix 1 for complete definitions of Tuden and Marshall's
codes).
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Results of the comparative analysis
In agrarian society, the police function played an important role to hold

the peasant mass in check. Because most agrarian societies were united by
military force, the government had to use some coercion to keep people together

in certain geographical areas.

Effective control of the migration of people

became an important question to agrarian society, since labor was the cardinal
productive force.
percent)

In the sample of 30 agrarian societies, twenty-two (73.3

had police functions that were specialized and institutionalized.

Preindustrial China is in the modal category on this variable (Table 1).
Table 1. Police

Value Label
not specialized
military organization
*specialized

Frequency

Total
Valid Cases
29
Missing Cases
(*China is in this category)

Percent
20.0
3.3

6
1

22

73.3

29

100.0
1

As a matter of fact, the data reflected the Chinese Baojia system. This
was a neighborhood administrative system organized on the basis of households
by which the government enforced its rule at the primary level at that time. The
government controlled all types of information about people through the Baojia
system. The police function of the system formed a primary basis for local
governmental rule.
The coded variable Levels of Sovereignty indicates the highest level of
indigenous political integration at which functionaries have the power to enforce
important decisions bearing on subordinate levels in the political structure (Tuden
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and Marshall 1972). Twenty of the 30 agrarian societies (66. 7 percent) were
coded thus: 'effective sovereignty is found at the third or higher level of political
integration above the local community, as in the case of a large state divided into
administrative provinces which are further subdivide into lesser administrative
districts' (Table 2).

Table 2.

Levels of Sovereignty Transcending the Local
Community

Value Label
absence
one level
two levels
*three levels or more

Frequency

Percent

3
20

10.0
10.0
13.3
66.7

30

100.0

3
4

TOTAL

Valid Cases
30
Missing Cases
( *China is in this category)

0

The political system of China had numerous layers. At the top was the
emperor followed by the royal family, eunuchs, and important literati who
composed the highest rank in the ruling pyramid.

The second level was

composed of many kinds of ministries. The third level consisted of the hierarchy
outside of the capital of the central government, at the provincial and local levels.
So multiple levels of sovereignty existed in the Chinese polity. Once again the
lowest level of political organization was found in the Baojia system.
After considering the police function and levels of sovereignty, naturally
we will ask who is yested with decision-making power at highest level of effective
sovereignty in agrarian societies.

The coded variables of Executive and

Deliberative and Consultative Bodies show us that most agrarian societies were
monarchies headed by a king or emperor.

There were no deliberative and
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consultative bodies as a rule. Succession of the executive was usually hereditary
within a ruling family or determined by a ruling clique.
Concerning the Executive function, in more than half of the societies (53.3
percent) the supreme decision-making authority was concentrated in a single
authoritative leader, eg., a paramount chief, king, or emperor (Table 3). The

Deliberative and Consultative Bodies variable reflects that in 66. 7 percent of
societies there was an 'absence of a deliberative body' (Table 4).

Table 3.

Executive

Value Label
no effective executive
council
shared executive
plural executive
*single executive

Frequency

Percent
10.0

3
1

3.3

9
1

30.0
3.3
53.3

16

TOTAL
30
Valid Cases
30
Missing Cases
(*China is in this category)

100.0
0

Table 4. Deliberative and Consultative Bodies

Value Label
*absence deliberative body
aristocratic deliver body
deliberative council
plural deliberative body
independent deliberative body

Frequency

Percent

20

66.7
3.3

1
3

10.0
6.7

2
4

TOTAL
30
30
Missing Cases
Valid Cases
(*China is in this category)

13.3
100.0
0
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In the political structure of China, the emperor and his court were at the

apex of a hierarchical establishment composed of a civil bureaucracy of the
Chinese literati. The emperor had absolute decision-making power in the whole
country, and the viceroys and governors were comparably powerful at the regional
and provincial levels.
magistrate.

In the local districts the dominant official was the

This structure based its claims of legitimacy on the hegemonical

ideology of Confucianism, which had been the universal faith in China since 206
B.C. The doctrines of 'Ren', 'Li' and 'De' played an indispensable function to
maintain the imperial dynasty's survival as already noted.
We need to. mention here that the emperor was usually succeeded by his
son or another family member, except when hereditary succession was disrupted
by rebellion or revolution.

But as soon as the rebel leader became the new

emperor, the hereditary system started to work again. This was because the
combination of patrimonial family structure and Confucian ideology reproduced
the same political structure.

In view of this, it is not difficult to see why the

Chinese political system lasted more than two thousand years.
The Chinese traditionally were never able to think of themselves as being
without an emperor. The Chinese people overwhelmed the last emperor in 1911
to establish a Republic, but they still maintained the political structure of the
imperial institution.

The paramount leader Chiang Kai-shei had supreme

dictatorial power, and no one could challenge him.

He was like a former

emperor. The SCCS data reflect this, based on the situation in 1936.
The other political variables still to be considered reflect the autocratic
power of the central Executive.

First, subordinate officials were typically

appointed by the supreme executive (51. 7 percent) (Table 5).

Second, the

principle subordinate functionaries were heads of territorial divisions of the state
who were closely supervised by the supreme executive and formed part of a
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centralized administrative system (50 percent) (Table 6). Third, in a plurality of
agrarian societies (46. 7 percent) the supreme executive appointed judicial
authority which was then relatively independent of the executive (Table 7). On
all of these dimensions, China was found to be in the modal categories. The long

tradition of centralization with supreme executive power exercised by the emperor
determined the Chinese political system and was also typical of other agrarian
societies.
Table 5. Selection of Subordinate Officials

Value Label
absence ei'fective sovereignty
patrilineal succession
hereditary succession
personal influence
election by constituencies
*supreme appointment
hereditary with appointment

Frequency
3
2

1
1.
4

TOTAL

Valid Cases
29
Missing Cases
(*China is in this category)

Percent
10.3
6.9
3.4
3.4

13.8

15

51.7

3

10.3

29

100.0
1

Table 6. Administrative Hierarchy

Value Label
absence effective sovereignty
councils of plural statuses
kin group
decentralized administration
*centralized administration
share authority with deliberate

Frequency

TOTAL

Valid Cases
30
Missing Cases
( *China is in this category)

3
2

Percent
10.0
6.7

13.3
10.0

4
3

15

50.0

3

10.0
100.0

30
0
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Table 7. Judiciary

Value Label
lack judicial authority
very limit judicial authority
executive as judicial power
*relatively independent

Frequency

Percent
1.0.0
1.0. 0
33.3

3
3

1.0
1.4

46.7

TOTAL
30
Valid Cases
30
Missing Cases
(*China is in this category)

1.00.0
0

Only on the political organizational characteristic of Advisory Bodies was
China found to be non-modal (See table 8). In fact, this variable reflects the
situation in which the supreme executive surrounded himself with advisors who
were family members.

Table 8. Advisory Bodies

Value Label
absence effective sovereignty
absence separate consultative
kin group
personal favorite of executive
advisory body
*consultative with hereditary
administrative advisory

Frequency

TOTAl
Valid Cases
29
Missing Cases
(*China is in·this category)

3
5
4

1.

Percent
1.0. 3
1.7.2
1.3.8
3.4

1

6.9
3.4

13

44.8

2

30

100.0
1

By describing, explaining, and comparing the data of the thirty agrarian
societies, we have verified that the political structure of pre-revolutionary China
fits the agrarian pattern very well.
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L

Additional characteristics of political structure and process in Imperial
China
Weber distinguished three types of authority (1947):
1) Rational legal authority--resting on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns
of nonnative rules and the rights of those elevated to authority;
2) Traditional authority--resting on an established belief in the sanctity of
inunemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising
authority;
3) Charismatic authority--resting

on devotion to the specific and

exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual
person, and of the nonnative patterns or order revealed or ordained by

him.
In the case of rational-legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally
established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority
of their office.

In the

case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the

person or the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority
and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition.

But here the obligation of

obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal
loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations.

In the case of charismatic

authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue
of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities
so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma
(Weber 1947).
Traditional authority was perhaps the most prevalent type in agrarian
societies in general and in China in particular.

The patriarchal family and its

extension as a model of state organization exemplified this. Patriarchalism is a
system where authority is usually organized on both an economic and a kinship
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basis, as a household.

Authority is exercised by a particular individual who is

designated by a definite rule of inheritance.
While primarily reflecting traditional authority, China's polity showed
characteristics of charismatic authority. Weber describes charisma as "a certain
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which is set apart from ordinary
men and treated as endowed with superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional
qualities" (1947, p. 329).

It is essential that the charismatic individual be

recognized or regarded as such.

This recognition is a matter of complete

personal devotion arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (Eisenstadt
1968, p. xviii). The idea of the 'Son of Heaven' exemplified this. As a matter of
fact, the political structure and process in China had always depended on the
leadership of the 'Son of Heaven', who embraced both traditional and charismatic
authority. Rational-legal authority was non-existent.
The institution of a supreme emperor began with unification in 211 BC.,
when the state of Qin conquered its neighbors and set the stage for the Han
dynasty during which Confucianism became a state doctrine or dominant ideology.
The emperor's absolute authority placed him in a unique position.

To the

Chinese people, the worship of Tian (heaven) as the supreme power was
restricted to the sovereign alone. His position was confirmed as the authorized
or legitimated leader of mankind, and he acted as their representative or
intermediary in neiotiating with the supreme being. Tian-Zi meaning 'Son of
Heaven' exercised a profound effect on the Chinese concept of sovereignty.
Confucianism, as a secular religion enhanced the position of emperor and
sanctified his sovereignty. In China, the throne of emperor was surrounded with
rituals which brought the mystical Tian near to the secular earth. The emperor
usually wrote in red and his officials wrote in black. In an audience, he alone
faced south, while they faced north. Only the emperor could use the special term
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Zhen , meaning I. The characters of his personal name were taboo throughout the
whole country, and- any reference to the emperor or the imperial will was always
separated from, and elevated above, the rest of the lines of any document in
which it appeared.

hnperial edicts were received with incense and ritual

prostration, and temples were built for the worship of His Majesty. All subjects
performed the traditional Kowtow (Ke Tou) and cheered 'Long live, long long live
the emperor' (WanSui WanWanSui) in the emperor's presence (This situation is
repeated in the Cultural Revolution in contemporary China).
Ideally, the sovereign emperor was pictured as a holy or saintly ruler, who
had been provided by heaven (Tian) so as to appear at the appropriate moment
on earth.

The connectio? between earthly government and the ordinances of

Heaven was taken further with the assumption that the 'Son of Heaven' was
responsible to Heaven for the welfare of his earthly charges. As 'Son of Heaven',
he maintained the universal harmony of man and nature by doing the right things
at right time according to the Mandate of Heaven (Ren, Li and De of
Confucianism). No one could challenge his power or question the morality of his
action.
How did the emperor rule his realm? As 'Son of Heaven', the emperor
was placed at the highest position of a power pyramid. Beneath him there was
a huge hierarchy with a pyramidal structure to rule the government and the
people (See chart 3). From the chart, we can see that the imperial emperor
stood at the apex of the pyramidal power structure. The literati, royal family, inlaw family of the emperor (WaiQi), and the eunuchs comprised the state
bureaucracy.
The political structure of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206--A.D. 202) illustrated
the supreme power of the emperor and the function of literati, WaiQi, and the
eunuchs. Its political patterns showed was similar to Rome's 'Authoritarian
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Chart 3. The Pyramidal Power Structure in
Imperial China
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bureaucracy' described previously.
First, the political authority in the state was completely centralized in the
sovereignty of the emperor. Second, the emperor's authority in the conduct of
the administration was exercised in his behalf by his chief ministers. They stood
at the top of a graded bureaucracy and were responsible to him for the success
or failure of the administration.

Third, this bureaucracy was centralized in the

vast palace at the capital (e.g., the Forbidden City in Beijing) where the emperor
exercised the power of appointment to office. His chief task became the selection
of civil servants (who came from the literati or the royal family), with an eye to
the maintenance of his power and his dynasty.
Among the three political factions (literati, patriarchal and in-law families
of the emperor, and eunuchs), the literati were the most important part of the
political structnre.

The Emperor actnally realized his rule depending on the

literati who shared. knowledge and a common ethics--Confucianism--which gave
the members of this faction a strong sense of solidarity (Pye 1978).
The Chinese literati were a statns group who had proven themselves in a
series of competitive examinations which tested their scholarship and the depth
of their knowledge of the Confucian tradition.

They played an indispensable

social function in the bureaucracy. Although numerically infinitesimal, the literati
were extremely powerful by reason of their unity and closeness to the emperor.
They owned the largest amount of land. This class possessed every privilege, the
highest being the privilege of reproducing itself, which was the monopoly of
Confucian education (Balazs 1964). The literati elite drew its strength from the
indispensable function it performed--the coordination and supervisors of the
productive labor of others.

This made the whole social organism work. All

mediating and administrative functions were carried out by the literati.
Most of the· Chinese people accepted the literati as their 'father-mother'
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officials (Fumu Guan). This was because the people were deeply influenced by
traditional

Confucianism.

A passage from Mencius (the most influential

Confucian after Confucius himself) who gave popular form to Confucian thought,
will give a much better idea about the literati:
"Great men have their business, and little men have their
business .... Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their
strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those
who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who
are governed by others support them; those who govern others are
supported by them" (See Balazs, p. 62, cited from Mencius m A,
4; trans. James Legge, Chinese Classics 2, 249-50).
Continuity of government was a necessity if the cohesion of a vast agrarian
empire was to be maintained. This explains why the ruling class was able to cling
so tenaciously to their prerogatives and last for such an astonishing length of
time. Without strict fulfillment of the coordinating function by the literati and
its united

political philosophy--Confucianism,

China

would quickly have

disintegrated (Balazs 1964).
It is important to point out that China adopted the Confucianism doctrine
as the dominant ideology, which was enhanced and promulgated by the literati.
It helped China to create a patriarchal, paternalistic world in which gradations of
rank, from the sovereign downward, were marked by the reciprocal relations of
favor and obligation. Individual rights, initiative, and liberty were entirely lacking.
Under the guidance of the state hegemony of Confucianism, all literati in the
central and local government performed their duty based on 'loyalty to the
emperor and taking care of the people according to Ren, Li, De'. The literati as
an elite group were contingent on the persistence of the ideal of a unified
Empire.

Of course, this situation helped the emperor to maintain the united

bureaucracy and his sovereign authority.
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There are two other important political groups, besides the literati in the
imperial era.

One consisted of the members of the patriarchal and in-law

families of the emperor. As mentioned before, the 'Son of Heaven' ruled the
whole country, which was just like a extended patriarchal family. So we can
imagine the function of the patriarchal family and in-law family in court politics.
Since the throne of the emperor usually devolved to the oldest son, the emperor
usually favored his in-laws for appointment as high officials of court politics so
as to avoid power struggles for the succession within his patriarchal family. This
was because the in-law family (WaiQi) or maternal relatives were the one group
of persons completely dependent upon the emperor's favor as well as tied to him
by marriage bonds (Fairbank 1986).
Meanwhile, the emperor kept a number of eunuchs who were devoted
exclusively to serve the person of the emperor.

It was their day-to-day

relationship with the emperor that helped them become another political interest
group. Within the palace there were many eunuchs (e.g. by the end of the Ming
dynasty, there were seventy thousand eunuchs in the Forbidden City; during Qing
dynasty the number exceeded one hundred thousand) who served for the
emperor's lifetime. In theory, the eunuchs had no role in the management of
government or the making any of public policy, however the emperor came to
rely on them more and more.
The emperor usually depended on eunuchs and relatives to supervise and
counter the power of the literati. The emperor always used these two groups to
supervise and control a large number of literati in the central and local
bureaucracy.

In the short term the supervisory function of in-law family and

eunuchs was an effective way to promote the whole organism to work well.
However, in the long term, it weakened and undermined the regular bureaucracy,
since the strong contradiction between well-educated literati, who depended on
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their own ability and knowledge of Confucianism, and in-law family members and
eunuchs, who were only personal favorites of the emperor, could not be avoided.
It often happened that in-law family members and eunuchs meddled in court

politics. This always had chaotic consequences, a situation that is repeatedly
verified by Chinese history. That is why the first emperor of each dynasty usually
strictly controlled the number of eunuchs and forbade the appointment of in-law
family members as high officials in the inner court. But it was impossible for
subsequent emperors to avoid using many in-law family members and large
numbers of eunuchs. A new dynasty reproduced or copied the same political
structure of the former dynasty. History was repeated with surprising similarity.
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Summary

My aim in discussing the political structure and process in imperial China
and comparing it with other agrarian societies is to establish a basis for
understanding the persistence of patrimonial politics and the cult of the supreme
leader in modem China. It is obvious that no one can conjure away the sheer
length of time the Chinese Empire lasted, or deny the permanence of the
imperial institutions, which endured in spite of successive metamoiphosis.

The

Chinese people overthrew the last emperor in 1911 and Mao Zedong brought
dramatic revolution to China after 1949, but post-revolutionary China is still
reacting to the legacies of imperial polity. Following the theory of Lenski et al.
(1991) a reason for this can be suggested in the fact that although modem China
has entered the industrial era, its polity still operates on an agrarian model. As
in other industrializing agrarian societies, China's leaders today are restricted to
forms of government and ideological discourse that were established in the
agrarian era.
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Part Il Post-Revolutionary China
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Chapter 3 Maoism as an Ideology

The twentieth century has witnessed the passing away of traditional
Chinese imperial political structure. Revolutionary elites appeared with a new
totalistic ideology--Marxist-Leninism and Maoism and established the People's
Republic of China.

The country entered the industrial era.

But as an

industrializing agrarian society, according to Lenski et al., China is a mixture of
the old and the new. Preindustrial technology is still widespread in agriculture.
In 1949, for example, there were only 401 tractors in the whole country and all

of these were imported. In 1958 the figure was 45,330 and in 1966 it stood at
over 200,000 with more than 2,200 state tractor stations. However, in spite of this
spectacular rise, in 1962 less than 10 percent of China's ploughland was being
worked by mechanical methods (Tregear 1980). Other evidence of industrializing
influences occurring in agricultural production can be seen in the growth in
powered irrigation and the use of artificial fertilizer (Table 9).
In 1949, the country still had a basically agrarian population distribution

with nearly 90 percent of the people living in rural areas, and preindustrial
agriculture predominated. The growth of mechanized agriculture in the decades
since the Chinese Revolution has steadily reduced the proportion of the rural
population compared to the urban (Table 10). But not until 1989 did a majority
of the Chinese people live in urban centers, and still China has a long way to go
to reach the advanced industrial pattern where only a tiny minority live in the
rural areas and are employed in agriculture.
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Table 9. Post-Revolutionary China: The Subsistence Technology and Rural

Tractors (excluding
small tractors)
(1,000)
Powered irrigation
(mill.hp)
Artificial fertilizer
used per mu
Gin)
Artificial fertilizer
(mill.tons)

Economic Indicators, 19S2-1980

1952

1957

1965

1976

1980

Increase
1952-1980(%)

1

1

7

40

75

7,400

0.1

0.6

9

54

75

75,000

0.1

0.4

3

8

17

7,000

0.2

2

5

12

12,000*

= roughly 0.5 kg.
* 1957-1980

Note: jin

Source: Adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 75
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Table 10. China's Urban and Rural Population, 1949-1989
Urban
Pop.
(mill.)
1949
1958
1966
1976
1978
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989

57.45
107.21
133.13
163.41
172.45
201.71
241.50
384.46
503.62
579.72

Rural

% of
Total
10.6
16.3
17.9
17.4
17.9
20.2
23.5
36.6
46.6

51.7

Pop.
(mill.)

% of
Total

48.40
552.73
612.29
773.76
790.14
799.01
786.14
665.98
577.11
540.77

89.4
83.7
82.1
82.6
82.l
79.2
76.5
63.4
53.4

48.3

Source from Jonathan D. Spence's "The Search For Modem China", Christopher J. Smith's "China: people and places in the land of
one billion" and Encyclopedic Britannica 1991.
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According to Lenski's ecological-evolutionary theory (1991), we should not
expect the Chinese polity to achieve the rational-legal fonns that characterize the
·polities of the advanced industrial societies while the technological base remains
largely agrarian. In following discussions, I will argue how the political structures
and ideology of China still follow the old agrarian pattern .

.L.

Maoism as a hegemonic ideology
According to Huntington, when traditional political institutions are

smashed by revolution, the post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence
of one strong political party (1968). The Chinese Communist Party·under Mao
was just that kind of party. Instead of a drive toward pluralism and a system of
legitimacy anchored in the realities of political processes, there was a frantic
search for a new totalistic ideology to replace the outdated and eroding
Confucian order. Marxist-Leninism in its Maoist form became that new moral
order which reenergized the elite's claims to moral superiority and invincibility.
The party as a new form of political organization assumed the role which the
literati and other traditional elites played in the agrarian polity. Social stability
depended direct!y on the strength of the Party and the Party's strength like that
of the literati of old depended on its unifying ideology. To keep the society in
harmony and order, the Party used Maoism as its dominant ideology, just as
Confucianism had played a similar function in pre-revolutionary China.
Hegemony is an important concept that comes from Gramsci's (1971)

prison noteboo~. Gramsci always emphasized that it was very critical for the
process of socialist transition to create a strong ideology. Although the Chinese
Communist Party has not adopted Gramsci's theory as its guiding thought (they
considered

Gramsci's thought to be anti-Marxist),

nevertheless similar to Gramsci's hegemony.

Chinese

ideology is
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The ruling class use their control of education, culture, communications
media, etc. to propagate hegemony in social life according to their interests.
Hegemony has created "a certain way of life and thought that is dominant, in
which one concept of reality is diffused through society in all its institutional and
private manifestations"' (Sallach 1974, p. 41). Ideological hegemony becomes the
main vehicle to realize social control by the ruling class.

This is clearly

exemplified by Maoism.
Mao applied the principles of Marxist-Leninism to the Chinese situation,
especially the 'successful experience' of the October Revolution of the former
Soviet Union. Then he generalized a set of theories and thought adapted for the
Chinese situation to guide the Chinese revolution. Through a combination of the
'universal principle of Marxist-Leninism' with Chinese practice, Maoism was
created.

The Chinese Communist Party under the direction of Mao Zedong

formed one of the largest ideological institutions of the modem world.
Mao Zedong once told American journalist Edward Snow if there were no
God in China, one would have to be created.

Mao understood the Chinese

traditional culture very well, especially the political consciousness of people who
needed a god-like emperor.

Mao like other agrarian leaders did not want to

promote the development of democratic politics or to reform the imperial
political consciousness of ,the old society. On the contrary, he took advantage of
people's old political consciousness: Mao became the new emperor.

(1)

The centrality of 'class struggle' in Mao's ideology
The central concept of Maoism is the notion of 'class struggle'. This

doctrine was deployed in Chinese society to control all economic and political
fields and social life until 1978. It reached its peak in the 'disaster' of the
'Cultural Revolution'. Mao insisted 'never forget class struggle'. He believed if
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the Party forced confrontations with sources of social resentment and discontent
even peasants could become 'conscious' and mobilized to the revolutionary
course. His idea was to keep society in a continual state of revolution.
The Chinese Party under Mao not only used all its ideological institutions
to propagate hegemony, but it also launched a number of mass movements to
continue the revolution. Under the directive of 'class struggle is not over yet',
they purged many people who disagreed with Mao, including higher leaders and
lower cadres. Mao let loose cruel struggles within the Party to consolidate his
hegemony.

"In the post-revolutionary period, the continuing series of political

and economic campaigns express most fully Mao's commitment to 'class struggle'"
(Solomon 1971, p. 256).
Here, I give an example how the Party used educational institutions to
influence the Chinese people. When I was a primary school student, our first
lesson was that Mao was the greatest liberator. He helped the Chinese people
to become emancipated from the feudalism, imperialism, and semi-colonialism
of old China. There was no room for any other ideologies but Maoism. The
second lesson was "Never forget class struggle" and "We would rather be a
socialist grass than a capitalist tree", "We would rather have socialist low ratio of
economic growth than capitalist high rate of growth", "We would rather stop
production for two years than stop 'class struggle' for one moment". When we
entered middle school, we had to study more of Mao's works. It was basic
education to the student in the period of the Cultural Revolution.

From the

beginning, we were completely influenced by Mao's thought. I think both Mao
and the Party clearly understood Gramsci's words "they (the ruling class) can
simply create a terrain more favorable to dissemination of certain modes of
thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire
subsequent development of national life" (Gramsci 1971, p. 184).
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(2)

'Small group' and political education
Mao depended on many kinds of 'small groups' (xiao zu) and political

education to realize 'class struggle' . 'Small groups' organize people to study
Maoism, the documents of the Chinese Communist Party, and the principles of
Marxist-Leninism.
From Martin Whyte (1974), we learn the most important of such efforts
was the formation of the Bao-Jia system. Thus, the 'small group' was actually a
legacy of imperial China.

According to official Qing dynasty (1644-1911)

documents, throughout the empire inhabitants were organized into groups of ten
households (termed a bai), ten of these groups were organized into a grouping
called ajia, and ten of these would in turn form a bao. Each grouping would
have a head chosen from its families, under the supervision of the Cun (small
town) magistrate and his assistants (Whyte 1974). The primary purpose of the
Bao-Jia system was to keep track of the population, control disorder, integrate

societal unity and consolidate the rule of government.

The Bao-Jia system

paralleled the 'small group' of post-revolutionary China, both in augmenting
formal organizational structures with semi-official groupings of ordinary citizens
and in assigning collective responsibility for reporting deviance to higher
authorities.
The many kinds of 'small groups' and neighborhood committees found in
every urban and rural residential register births and deaths, organize political
study meetings for imbuing the Communist Party's ideology, and mediate family
disputes. To some extent, therefore, the 'small group' was patterned after the
imperial Bao-Jia system. But the post-revolutionary bureaucracy under Mao
extended much further down into society and was able to maintain closer
supervision over basic level groups. 'Small groups' were organized primarily on
the basis of units of work or study, although there were also residential groups.
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The systematic ideological study and mutual group criticism of political education
' '
made up the central topic of the 'small groups'. Chinese Communist 'small
group' ritual harkens

back to more general practices, inclinations,

and

philosophical themes of traditional China (Whyte 1974).
The 'small group' aimed at political indoctrination. The formal hierarchy
of political indoctrination included: the Party Central Committee and propaganda
department at the top, study committees at territorial and organizational levels
down to the individual unit, and 'small groups' divided into different grades under
the local study committee. Everyone in the country was involved in these 'small
groups' to accept political education. The content of the indoctrination consisted
in Mao's books and speeches, Party Central Committee's documents, and MarxistLeninist orthodoxy. Political study was divided into distinct stages: individual
study, mutual-help 'small group' meetings, 'small group' discussions, mutual
criticism, large meetings, and summations (Whyte 1974). This situation, by and
large, still exits in contemporary China.
Maoism could be seen as the dominant ideology which played the same
function as Confucianism in imperial China. In traditional China the unity of
society was preserved by subjecting the potential governing elite to a long course
of study of orthodox philosophical texts--Confucianism. Unified in outlook by this
rigid indoctrination, the elite could then give unity to the state bureaucracy and
the entire society. A similar practice exits in post-revolutionary China, although
the nature of both the texts and the elite has changed (Whyte 1974).
In conclusion, 'small group' ritual is highly routinized, performing a
maintenance function throughout the whole society. It contributes to preventing
deviance and maintaining

social control. So, we would say, the Chinese

Communist Party seems to be more successful in getting people to 'drop' old
habits and to· undertake new tasks through the ritual of political education than
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they are in maintaining change (Whyte 1974). Finally, 'small group' ritual plays
an important function of effective communications, of getting official ideas,
especially Mao's ideas, down to ordinary citizens.
2.

Political ritual during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
As a charismatic leader of the Chinese Party and people, Mao had

sovereign authority. In effect, he created himself to become a new emperor.
According to Durkheim (1965), the experience of religion and the idea of the
divine are the products of collective activity. Religious belief and social ritual
enhance the solidarity of the collective or group on which people depend. In
other words, there . exists a reciprocal relationship between religion and society.
Religious belief symbolically expresses social reality (Durkheim 1965). Social
ritual makes use of common emotions and interests to bind people together in
the collective activity and to strengthen the moral order. Thus, social ritual is a
primary mechanism for promoting integration and unity in society.
Why does social ritual produce a mystical energy to bind individuals
together and make people forget their private interests for the sake of the
collectivity? Where does the mystical energy come from?

When individuals

come together in social rituals, they focus their attention and behavior on
common symbols.

As a result of their interaction and inter-stimulation, a

powerful emotional energy is produced. Each individual feels about him others
who share the common experience.
reinforced.

This causes the emotional energy to be

The conduct of each person promotes a common experience that

transcends the individual participants. This effect is very important to social life
and society, because the emotions of the collective group cause their members to
unite and it strengthens

their social bonds.

The spatial and temporal

concentration of the participants during social ritual acts as an exceptionally
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powerful stimulus. Thus, Durkheim said: "When they (individuals) are once come
together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports
them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds
a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside
impressions; each echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial
impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance"
(Durkheim 1965, p. 247). In this collective ambience, each person experiences
a supernatural strength which makes all feel inseparable.
When we use Durkheim's ideas about religious belief and ritual to
understand modern society, we can see that what goes on in social ritual can play
an important role to bind individuals together for political purposes.

Using

Durkheim we can understand why Mao used 'political ritual' to promote political
ideology and the legitimacy of his regime.

The political deification of Mao

Zedong succeeded in binding the Chinese people together and created an intense
collective awareness during the Cultural Revolution.
When the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of
China in 1949, Confucianism and other kinds of religious belief such as Buddhism
and Taoism were abolished and replaced by Marxist doctrine which declared
'religion is the opiate of the people'.
discontinued.

All traditional religious ritual was

The only dominant ideology of post-revolutionary China was

Maoism, which combined Marxism-Leninism with concrete conditions in China.
But according to Durkheim, rituals are a system of rites that every society uses
as an adhesive to hold itself together. Rituals must exist even in secular societies.
Although the Chinese Party eliminated Confucianism and other religious belief,
they initiated and encouraged a new form of social ritual activity centered around
Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Party, so as to realize the common goal of
'utopian socialism' during the Cultural Revolution.
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In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao was seen as the 'Great
Leader', 'Great Helmsman', and 'Great Liberator' and was widely worshipped by
the people.

Each person took part in 'small group' rituals to accept political

education and to understand Maoist doctrines.

Maoism became the new

orthodoxy. The political rituals which deified Mao penetrated the whole society.
At that time, there were many slogans such as 'Long live Chairman Mao' and
'Be ready to die in defense of Chairman Mao' displayed everywhere. There were
many songs which children sang reminiscent of Western hymns in praise of Jesus.
The content proclaimed: 'My love for my parents is great but greater still is my
love for Chairman Mao', or 'We think of you every minute, respected Chairman
Mao'. The cult of personality, which the 'small group' pushed to the extreme,
derived implicit support from the previous long history of emperor worship.
Loyalty toward the leader rested on the traditional concept of loyalty to one's
superiors in all political and social ranks. The injunction, 'every directive issued
by Chairman Mao must be obeyed whether you understand it or not, agree with
it or not', drew on the traditional Confucian virtue of obedience.
Meanwhile, Mao was glorified as 'The Red Sun', 'The Great Teacher',
'The Great Commander', 'The Great Steersman' and 'The Messiah of Working
People'. Mao became a symbol of the divine, the source of supernatural energy.
Catching a glimpse of him in public left observers with unforgettable memories,
and many were reduced to tears by the experience.

A kind of supernatural

energy was produced by collective ritual activities. The individuals and masses
would spend the night in the street if they knew Mao's route the next day would
take him past them. When Mao finally appeared, the people would jump, shout,
cry out and shake the 'Little Red Book' of Mao in paroxysms of joy. Because
individuals, who had obeyed Mao as their god and who for this reason believed
that Mao was with them, approached the world with confidence and with a

46
feeling of increased energy. A collective will to worship Mao penetrated each
person and became an integral part of the Chinese people.
Mao's appearances verify what Durkheim said about the particular attitude
of a man speaking _to a crowd. If he has succeeded in entering into communion
with the crowd, his· language has a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in
ordinary circumstances; his gestures show a certain domination; his very thought
is impatient of all rules, and easily falls into all sorts of excesses (Durkheim 1965,

p. 241). Mao's enormous presence was something very real; it came to him from
the masses which he always addressed.

The sentiments provoked by his words

(Mao's Little Red Book) came back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to
this degree the masses of society strengthened his own sentiment.

Under this

circumstance, Mao became a leader of confidence, courage and boldness of
action, just like the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of his god turned
graciously toward him (Durkheim 1965, p. 242). Like the emperors of old, Mao
became an omnipotent, god-like figure whom no one could challenge.
Political ritual activities of deification were set up in association with the
fanatic devotion to the idol Mao. For instance, it was very common that, in the
morning before breakfast, family members stood before Mao's picture asking for
instructions for the day. In the evening, standing before Mao's picture again, they
made a quiet confession of the 'sins' they had committed during the day. People
worshiped Mao as a routine activity--often before working, before class, before
a meeting, or before dinner. They would all stand up, facing Mao's picture, and
say 'we wish longevity to our Great Leader, the Reddest Sun in our heart,
Chairman Mao'. When a formal meeting or a conference was held, two songs in
praise of Mao were added at the beginning and the end of the meeting 'The East
is Red' and 'Sailing in the Sea Relies on the Helmsman'. Here I quote a few
lines from these songs.
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'Red is the east, rises the sun.
China has brought forth a Mao Ze-dong.
For the people's happiness he works
He is the people's liberator'.

*

*

*

*

*

'Sailing the seas depends on the Hehnsman
Life and growth depend on the sun.
Rain and dewdrops nourish the crops,

Making revolution depends on Mao Ze-dong's thought,
Mao's thought is the sun that forever shines'.
These two songs were considered as sacred as the Chinese national
anthem. The masses were also expected to learn and practice a special dance of
loyalty to Mao. While performing the loyalty dance people used to hold the
'Little Red Book' on their chest. Meanwhile they sang a song such as 'The East
is Red' as they danced.

Thus Mao was worshiped continually through verbal

expression, singing and dancing. These ritual activities expressed the idea that
Mao had saved the Chinese people from the miserable 'old society'. He was the
great liberator of the people and he would lead them on the right path. Thus the
collective values were dramatized and reinforced (Wuthnow 1987), and social
cohesion was promoted.
In the midst of this effervescent social environment and out of this
effervescence itself Maoism as religious belief penetrated the whole society. The
social rituals to "which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon
its members, are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign provocative of
respect" (Durkheim 1965, p. 238). Mao's works were 'holy writ': one sentence
spoken by him was as potent as ten thousand ordinary sentences, and his writing
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was printed in the 'Precious Red Book'. In order to make them more accessible
and convenient for a person to carry, some of his quotations were collected in the
'Little Red Book' and handed out to each individual (Jiping Zuo 1991), just like
the Bible comes in many forms and sizes to facilitate its wide use in a Christian
country. People could memorize each sentence of the 'Red Book' by heart and
use Mao's words to solve daily problems.

People often met together to study

Mao's works as Christians read the Bible.
Moreover, during that period, whenever a new 'highest instruction' from
Mao was announced, people would go into the streets and celebrate at the very
moment the new instruction was released, even if it was midnight, holding the
'Red Book' high in their hands. The supernatural, mystical strength of Mao made
individuals forget their own interests, they made themselves his devotees.
When Durkheim used the concept of 'symbol' to explain the elementary
belief of the Australian societies, he said: "In fact, it is a well-known law that the
sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the
symbol which represents them" (Durkheim 1965, p. 251).

In the Cultural

Revolution, red, for the Chinese people, was a sign of loyalty to Mao. It also
suggested love. This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that
the idea of Mao and the symbols of Mao were closely united in individuals'
minds.

The result was that the emotions provoked by the one ·extended

contagiously to the other. During that period, the relationship between Mao and
the masses was seen as that of the sun and sunflowers. Like sunflowers turning
toward the sun, the hearts of people turned toward Mao. The Chinese people
were unable to think of themselves being without Chairman Mao during the
Cultural Revolution, just as the agrarian Chinese state was unthinkable without
the Emperor to guide it.
All of the places where Mao had ever stayed, such as SaoSan in which he
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was born, Tiananmen Gate, etc., were seen as 'holyplaces' and they often evoked
strong emotions of love. People went to there to demonstrate their respect for
Mao.
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Summary

Mao and the Party's lea?ers successfully employed rituals to achieve
political cohesion. Chinese society showed cohesion and unity at least until Mao
died in 1976, even though Mao's aura covered up .a lot of instability and inner
tensions.
If we compare Maoist political ritual activities to the imperial Chinese

polity, we observe that Maoism was like a new Confucianism.

The orthodox

position on Mao's thought served as a justification for the status quo in the
Chinese Communist system. Since Mao's doctrines were treated religiously, they
legitimated his regime and prevented any changes either on the theoretical level
or in practice (Zuo Jiping 1991).
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Chapter 4 Political Structure in Modem China

Chinese agrarian society based on subsistence level production and the
ideology of Confucianism formulated a hierarchical structuring of society with
traditional and charismatic authority; a collectivist organization at the village and
neighborhood level with individuals made subservient to the large group; and a
tightly knit social network, with a strong emphasis on the extended family. In this
chapter, I exhibit the particularistic ties of patronage, nepotism, and favoritism
that have persisted in contemporary China.
Huntington · (1968) considers that the party, as a new form of political
organization after the revolution, takes over traditional elites and social stability
depends directly on the strength of the party. He proposes a one dominant party
model. In a dominant ·party system only one party has capacity to govern the
whole society.

The processes determining governmental policy and political

leadership function almost exclusively through the framework of a single party.
The party becomes the source of legitimacy and since the party is the institutional
embodiment of national sovereignty, it becomes the popular will. The dominant
party decides the paramount position of political leaders and their fortunes as
representatives of the people's interest. Under these circumstances, one might
infer that the party bureaucracy should be highly efficient in implementing its
policies.
The political structure of post-revolutionary China was based on just such
a dominant party system--the Chinese Communist Party. But its political system
and bureaucracy are nevertheless very inefficient. So the Chinese case does not
fall into Huntington's model of a dominant party system. Lenski's ecological-
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evolutionary theory better explains China's difficulty converting traditional and
charismatic authority to rational-legal authority.
Lenski et al. argue that in industrializing agrarian societies, one of the
greatest hindrances to development has been the kind of governing class they
inherited form the past (1991). The legacies of imperial political structure and
process still have a strong influence on the Chinese Communist government.
When we look at China, it seems like Confucianism is reborn in Mao's dominant
ideology along with features of the agrarian polity such as patrimonialism,
nepotism and favoritism. These legacies caused China's single party system to
have inefficiencies not explained by Huntington's model.

L

Historical factors in the development

of patronage.

nepotism. and

favoritism
The most egregious mistake made by many was the belief that legalism,
which had played an important role during the first dynasty, was compatible with
Confucianism. Confucianism, with its emphasis on personal relationships, kinship
and fealty to elders, masters, and emperor, unconditionally

became the

hegemonic ideology of the ruling class, and the concept of the role of law was
very far from the -consciousness of the Chinese leaders, officials, and masses.
Although China advocates the establishment of a rationalized legal system today,
Stavis states that: "It would be the most radical break in China's three thousands
years of political tradition to have the top leadership legitimize its power in laws
and popularly elected institutions" (Stavis 1983, pp. 189-91).
Since the Han Dynasty, Confucianism with its emphasis on personal
relationships and blood-ties overshadowed the rule of law.

In fact, it was

impossible to avoid informal patron-client relations, nepotism and favoritism.
This is because in China all individuals belonged to a network of particularistic
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relationships, some in which an individual was dominant, and some in which he
was subservient.
2.

Patronage (patron-client relations) in post-revolutionary China
China was in chaos after the May Fourth Movement overthrew the last

emperor of Chinese history. Who could rule the huge country and its people?
After more than thirty years of war, including anti-Japanese struggles coupled
with a long and terrible domestic war against Chiang Kai-si and the
Kuangmingdang, the Chinese Communist Party established the Peoples Republic
of China (P.R.C.) in 1949. The Party offered many kinds of privileges in politics,
economy and social life. Thus, another form of patrimonialism (patronage),
nepotism and favoritism appeared in China; and although the emperor no longer
existed, the features of the old order were still at work.
According to Weber, in an organization based on rational-legal authority,
political leaders should act in obedience to the regulations of law and order. But
in China, because there is no institutionalization of rational-legal bureaucracy, the
Chinese political leaders have to set up many alliance or special personal
relationships with each other so as to maintain their power or to fight others for
personal security.

Each high official of the central government has his own

patron-client network. The practical situation of the Party and the government
bureaucracy reflects Eisenstadt's statement:

"The most important tensions

inherent in these relations (patron-clients) are those between the emphasis on
purely solidary or spiritual relations and concrete--power and instrumental-obligations" (1984, p. 14).
In China, the Communist Party Chairman such as Mao Ze-dong or Deng
Xiao-ping as paramount leaders were much like an emperor with the supreme
decision-making concentrated in their hands. The only difference was that they
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couldn't appoint their own sons as their direct successors, but they could
detennine or choose the successor of the Party who came from the ruling clique.
The basis of power networks in politics is a pattern of personal bonds
known as GuanXi .

GuanXi

describes

the intense, personal

bonds of

acquaintanceship and mutual belonging that give vivid context to the networks of
personal associations (Pye 1981). Only through GuanXi, could political leaders
set up networks for confirming power or enlarging influence so that they could
hold predominant power. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, "this is evidence
of clientelistic networks within state socialist regimes" (1981, p. 234).
In China political decisions are firmly controlled by the politburo and the
secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party and by the Standing Committee of
the State Council, the top Commanders of the military, and the leaders of the
wealthiest and largest cities and provinces (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986). In
Harding's analysis of radical and moderate reform (1986), we can see how patronclient relationships work among the Chinese political elites.
Deng Xiaoping is the patron of General Secretary Hu Yao-bang, Zhao
Zhi-yang, vice premier Wan Li, Tian Ji-yun and Zhu Rong-ji.
reformers who emphasized as their basic program

They were

developing a commodity

economy and decreasing the socialist planned economy while moving toward a
market economy gradually. Veteran leaders Chun Yun, Peng Zheng, Premier Li
Peng and Vice premier Yao Yi-lin are represented as moderate reformers who
place their emphasis on using a 'state economic plan' as guidance for developing
a national economy. They fought their way to the top through a combination of
factors: the influence of patrons, Deng Xiaoping and Chun Yun; the
persuasiveness of their policy recommendations; political skill and knowledge; and
the networks of personal connections built up over many years (Lieberthal and
Oksenberg 1986).
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Because Hu Yaobang had formed a patron-client relationship with Deng
Xiaoping since the early 1940's, when Deng took over from former Chairman
Hua Guofeng, he appointed Hu Yaobang to be the General Secretary. Zhao
Zhiyang was the governor of Sichuan province (Deng's hometown) before he was
appointed premier in 1981. It was due to the special personal relationship with
Deng and his loyalty to Deng that he got the chance to enter the highest political
position. Deng as their patron gave them the opportunity to become the elite
leaders; meanwhile Deng got his clients' support to confinn his supreme position
over the whole Party and the government.
It is through GuanXi that political elites establish reciprocal dependent
relationships with political allies to protect themselves in political struggles.
Actually in Chinese politics, names of elites never stand alone, for they are always
linked, for better or worse, with others. Whenever a new name is added to the
politburo or the standing committee, everyone speculates about the newcomer's
personal affiliations, and hence about whose power has brought about this new
appointment and whether the sponsor was in fact shrewd in sponsoring such an
individual (Pye 1981).
\Vhy do Chinese political elites need tQ set up GuanXi ? Traditional
Chinese culture (Confucianism) emphasized the importance of handling many
kinds of GuanXi in a huge social web. The main reason, the main motivation,
is to search for career security and protection of power. "The extraordinary force
that holds together the networks of officials is the intense attraction of mutual
dependency in the Chinese culture between superiors and subordinates, each of
whom needs the other for his own protection and each of whom is vulnerable to
the other... " (Pye 1981, p. 7). Under this circumstance,. personal relationship
strengthens allies and integrates and creates linkage networks that extend upward
in support of particular leaders as 'patrons' who, in turn, look for 'clients' to
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ensure their power. Weber's ideal-type of impersonal management does not exist.
Personal loyalty and informal GuanXi have a dominating presence on the Chinese
political stage.
The endless unpredictable

political struggles for power within the

Communist Party became another reason for political elites and officials to search
for patronage as protection against repeated purges of rivals by the predominant
leader.

More than 30 years of political power struggles has taught people to

search for patron-clients relationships so as to protect themselves. In the 1950's,
the Great Leap Forward and "Hundred Flowers Bloom, A Hundred Schools
Contend" campaign caused a number of higher leaders, including Marshal Peng
Dehai, to lose office and to be put into jail. In the 1960's, National leaders Liu
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were purged by Mao Zedong in the Cultural
Revolution.

Thousands of officials were forced into study groups of Maoist

thought or sent to the countryside to accept re-education. In the 1970's the Lin
Biao rebellion caused another purging campaign.

Mao allowed Deng to

reappear, but Deng was purged again in early 1976. In similar fashion, Deng
Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other political elites launched many campaigns after
Mao's death: a period of criticism of 'bourgeois liberalism' in 1980-1981; a
campaign against 'spiritual pollution' in the ideological and cultural sphere in
1983-1984; and a crackdown against corruption in 1985-1986 (see chapter 7).
From these unpredictable political movements, we can see that the rule
of law has meant little in modem China. In the face of many political upheavals,
higher leaders, officials and masses became victims of political struggles and many
people, including officials at all levels, were left to wonder what the highest
leader; such as Mao, Deng and the Party apparatus wanted.

The non-

institutionalized Chinese bureaucracy did not ensure a stable power position and
personal security in these political struggles.

Those who wanted to pursue
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protection of their power or keep their higher social status and win promotion or
maintain personal security, had to seek as their patrons those most powerful
leaders, who in turn wove webs of personal dependence with their clients.
According to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, bonds of GuanXi arise from
family connections, common geographical origin, shared experience (school or
military service ties), or shared loyalty toward the same patron or commander
(such as Zhou Enlai or Deng Xiaoping) (1988).

When Hu Yao-bang was

General Secretary from 1981 to 1987,people who associated with the Communist
Youth League in the 1950' s which Hu headed were able to rise to good positions
rapidly; and people who were trained in Moscow in 1950's, where Li Peng was
active, were winning positions at many levels when Li became Premier. From
this, we can clearly see how important patron-clients relations are.
1,_

Taizidang in China
Under Confucianism kinship relations were extremely important in the

agrarian polity and they have retained this importance in modern China. The
term Taizidang is used in referring to nepotism in the Chinese bureaucracy.

Taizidang actually is a general designation for the children of the Chinese highlevels cadres. But it has a special meaning in politics. It is a group of people
who, as children of political elites of China (most of them were founders of
P.R.China), have been promoted to high-level government and Party positions.
These 'princes' hold the same important political positions as their parents.
Table 11 shows characteristics of Taizidang members. It is the privileged
families that can offer their children overseas study (formerly the Communist
leaders always sent their children to Moscow, but now children of Taizidang are
sent to the U.S.A.). If we look at 'family background', we find that most of the
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Taizidang'sparents held important positions, including former National Chairman,
former Premier, Vice-Premier, Vice-Chairman of Military Committee, Ministers,
Marshals 1 etc. That is to say, most Taizidang members are the descendants of old
revolutionaries who made great contributions to the Chinese revolution and
whose sufferings in the Cultural' Revolution are highly appreciated in Chinese
society.
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Table 11. Profiles of Select Members of Taiwang
Name

AGE

POSITION

EDUCATION

FAMILY BACKGROUND

Li Peng

62

PB\CC\Premier

University(O)

Zhou Enlai, Deng Yinzhao(AS),fonner premier

Zhou Jiahua

63

PB\CC\vice-Premier

University(O\D)

Ye Jianying(SL),fonner vice Chairman of the
Party, former Chairman of military committee

Ye Xuanping

65

CC\Vice-Chairman

University(O\D)

Ye Jianying(S), see above (former marshal)

Peng Shilu

65

Vice-Minister

University(O\D)

Peng Pai(S), former minister

Ding Henggao

59

CC\Minister

University

Nie Rongzhen(SL), former marshal of PLA

Chen Changyi

56

CC\Provincial secretary

University

Xi Zongxun(SL), former standing committee member

Li Changan

56

Minister

University

Li Fuchun(S), former vice premier

Li Tieying

54

PBICC\State Councilor

University

Li Weihan(S), one of oldest revolutionary

Song Ruixiang

51

Governor

University

Song Renqiong(S), former standing committee member

Liao Hui

49

CC\vice-Minister

University

Liao Chenzhi(S), former minister

Zhang Boxing

?

CC\Provincial secretary

Unknown

Peng Zheng(SL), former chairman of national committee

Bu He

?

CC\Govemor

Unknown

Ulanfu(S), former vice chairman of national committee

Wu Shaozu

?

CC\Minister

Unknown

Wu Yunfu(S), former minister

Chen Haosu

48

Vice-Minister

University

Chen Yi(S), former vice premier and marshal

He Pengfei

46

Major General

Unknown

He Long(S), former vice premier and marshal

Chen Yuan

54

Minister

University

Chen Yun(S), former vice chairman of the Party

Qiao Zonghuai

?

·CC\Vice Minister

Unknown

Qiao Guanhua(S), former minister

Liu Yuan

48

CC\Govemor

University

Liu Shaoqi(S), former chairman of Chinese government

Xie Jingping

?

Governor

Unknown

Xi Zhongxun(S), former standing committee member

Yu Zhengsheng

45

Major

Unknown

Zhang Aiping(SL), former general of PLA
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Note: All position are as of November, 1989. (Zhou Jiahua became vicepremier in 1991). Biographical information is from Zhonggong Renming Lu
(Taibei: Guoli Zhengzhi daxue, 1983), Wolfgang Barike, who's who in the
People's Republic of China, 2nd ed. (NY, K.G. Saur 1987. and China Directory
1990 (Tokyo: Radio Press, Nov. 1989). PB, CC and PLS stand for Politburo and
Central Committee members and People's Liberal Army; Oand D for attendance
at universities overseas or domestically; and AS, S and SL for adopted son, son
and son in law (All information came from "Studies in Comparative
Communism", Vol 24, No. 1, March 1991, p. 58-76).
This situation in the P.R.C. is not unique, but has a counterpart.

When

we look into the political high-ranking elites of Taiwan (Republic of China), a
country which shares the same agrarian legacies of imperial China with the
People's Republic of China, we find a strong similarity between Taizidang in
Taiwan and Taizidang in Communist China (See table 12).
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Table 12: The 13th KMT Central Committee Members with High-ranking Cadre Family Background
Name

Position

Family Background

Chen Li-an

Standing committee member
minister of economic affair

Father: Ch'en Ch'en
former premier

Soong Ch'u-yu

Standing committee member
deputy general of the KMT

Father: Soong Ta,
general of the army

Lian Chan

Standing committee member
minister of foreign affairs

Father: Lian Chen--g
president's adviser

Kuo Wan-lung

Standing committee member
minister of finance

Husband: Ni Wen-ya, standing

Chien Fu

Standing committee member
Chairman of committee of Economic Construction

Father: Chien She-Iiang,former
president of Academy of Science

Chien Chun

Member of Central Committee, secretary general
of Executive Yuan

Father: Chien She-Jiang,
(see above)

Ma Ying-jeou

Member of Central Committee, deputy general of
Central Committee

Father: Ma Heh-ling, deputy
director, Control Yuan

Chiang Hsiao-yen

Member of Central Committee, vice-minister of
foreign affair

Father: Chiang Ching-kuo, former
president, son of Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang Hsiao-tsu

Member of Central Committee

Father: Chiang Ching-Kuo, see above

Chiang Hsiao-yung

Member of Central Committee

Father: Chaing Ching-Kuo, see above

Ting Mao-shih

Member of Central Committee

Father-in-law: Huang Chieh, former
general of army

Wang Hsiao-Ian

Member of Central Committee

committee member

Father: Wang Tih-wu, former standing
committee member

Yu Fan-ying

Member of Central Committee

Father: Ku Cheng-kang, former standing
committee member
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Source: These data are from various issues of Hsin-hsin-wen (New News
Weekly) (TaiPei) (See "Transformation and Change in Mainland China and
Taiwan, p. 24)
Eisenstadat and Roniger 'argue that the family is the initial 'coalition' on
which unconditional trust is based (1984). If the father was 'dragon' or 'phoenix',
the son should be 'dragon' or 'phoenix' . The situation replicated that of the
feudal China in which the traditional family structure was also linked to the
'politics of the emperor's relatives on his wife's side of his family' (waiqi), which
took advantage of their special privilege to promote their offspring to higher
positions of power. As well, the Taizidang also reflects the strong influence of
Confucianism.

Of course, Taizidang not only depend on their own family

background, but also rely on GuanXi or patron-client relations.

Under the

unwritten code of 'caring for the children of old comrades-in-arms, old workmates, old superiors, and old subordinates' (huxiang zhaogu laozhanyou laotongshi

laoshangji laobuxia de zinu), a number of princes of old political elites have been
promoted to important positions of the state and the Party, ranging from premier
to provincial governors.
4.

The evezyday reality of GuanXi
GuanXi and nepotism penetrate all ranks of Chinese society today, not

only the political elite. The only difference is that for the common people it
emphasizes material interests, rather than seeking political power. This network
of GuanXi in every day life is a system in which an individual develops a series
of acquaintances for whom favors are done in the expectation of returned favors
at some time in the future.

Having good GuanXi proves to be an extremely

useful way of getting things done in a resource-scarce environment (fmding a
good job, getting a good house and good pay, etc.). It takes many forms, varying
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all the way from perfectly legal 'string pulling' with small gifts and favors, to outright corruptions, involving bribery and criminal actions. Nevertheless, GuanXi
works for those able to use it.
For example, one of my friends went to work at the International
Investment and Trust Corporation, which is one of the best companies in my
hometown. It is difficult to become an employee if you don't have good GuanXi
with company officials (lingdao), even though you may have high qualifications.
There are only forty employees in the company. Of these, 35 have many kinds of

GuanXi with the lingdao. Some of them are children of 'old comrades-in-arms',
or 'work-mates', or 'old superiors' and 'old subordinates'.

Their parents had

established good GuanXi a long time before. (My friend's father was supervisor
of the current president many years ago, so it was easy for my friend to become
an employee of that company). Employees became 'clients' of the lingdao. So
people always say': "even though you have thousands of good things and thousands
of good qualities, you are nothing as long as you do not have a 'good father"'.

GuanXi causes serious corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy. The policy
of "reform and open to the rest world" created numerous opportunities for

GuanXi . From the beginning of 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his followers set out
to re-establish some private incentives in China's economy, which had reached the
brink of collapse after the Cultural Revolution. Their intentions were to assert
individuals' rights · to transact with each other and therefore ease problems
encountered in the central coordination of agricultural and industrial production.
Their aim was to gradually change the economic system from a central planning
economy to a quasi-market economy. To do this, they established some private
property rights and allowed decentralized markets a large role in allocating scarce
goods. Within these markets they allowed prices to fluctuate (Sands 1990). Since
there is no strict scientific management and institutionalized bureaucracy, abuse
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of governmental authority and the use of GuanXi became serious problems.
Because both prices and supplies of consumer goods were fixed too low, one only
obtained many goods either by standing in lines or using GuanXi. Those who had
bureaucratic connections clearly gained under this system. If one had access to
a scarce good, one could parley this access into increased command over other
goods through direct exchange. (This phenomenon was called houmen , or
backdoor.) Many officials found themselves in an excellent position to 'get rich'
and to 'glorify' themselves, because they had some control over distribution.

GuanXi has caused other problems for the Chinese bureaucracy. First, it
has caused millions of Yuan in states funds to flow into the hands of small
collectives

and

individuals

through

numerous

loopholes,

thus

seriously

undermining the Chinese economic reform. Second, corruptions caused by using
public office for private gain and pursuing personal comfort have seriously
undermined the credibility of the reform process. Third, the legitimacy of the
national government is undermined, as the events in the Tianmen Square clearly
show.
Why can't the Chinese Communist Party rid itself of GuanXi , and
nepotism?

There are three main reasons: (1) The P.R.C. was established and

developed on an agrarian societal base that is only beginning to industrialize.
These patterns

cannot be done away with quickly or easily.

(2) The

overcentralized power of the Chinese Communist Party favors patron-client
exchange, GuanXi and nepotism. There is no institutionalized bureaucracy to
constrain the absolute power of the Party which promotes 'personality politics'

(renzhi); (3) The privileges of the Party foster the development of GuanXi and
nepotism. To acquire scarce resources, individuals have to establish good GuanXi
and form their own network if they want to live better and feel more secure.
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Summary

Patronage, nepotism and favoritism are deeply rooted in the agrarian
pattern of Chinese society. Although the Chinese leaders are motivated by a
desire to get rid of these imperial legacies, the monopoly power of the
Communist Party and the overcentralization of the bureaucracy
these informal relations in Chinese society.

exacerbates

It is difficult for the Chinese

government to change the structure of 'personality politics' and Party sovereignty,
so that these informal relationships continue to undermine the development of
a rational political process. Moreover, the low level of industrial development
does not permit a rapid restructuring of the polity in a more rational-legal
direction (Lenski et al. 1990).
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Chapter 5 The Chinese Bureaucracy in an Era of Gradual Industrialization

Agrarian societies with their low standard of living for the majority of the
population, low efficiency technologies, and low investment in human capital
could not sustain large-scale institutions along the lines of Weber's ideal-type
bureaucracy.

This situation persisted in industrializing agrarian societies like

China in recent decades.

In this chapter I will discuss additional features of

China's political bureaucracy not anticipated from Weber's framework.

L

Personalized rule and acute political struggle
According to Weber, in an organization based on rational-legal authority

with an emphasis on formal rules and procedures, political leaders should act in
obedience to the requirements of the law and not in accordance with personal
whim. But in China the political process operates in a different way. The one
party system cannot avoid serious political struggles like those which occurred in
the imperial era. During the Cultural Revolution, the personalized rule of Mao
Zedong reached an apex, as we saw in chapter 3. After Mao consolidated his
power, he purged Liu Shaoqi, the former Chairman of the country. This was a
continuation of the political struggles that were so familiar in the agrarian polity.
One problem concerns strongly centralized decision making.

Political

decisions are firmly controlled by the Party Politburo, the Secretariat, the Military
Affairs Commission, and the Government State Council.

A few high level

officials decide the fate of the Chinese people. But Chinese leaders have seldom
obeyed formal rules and bureaucratic procedures when they made decisions. The
reform policy regarding Chinese agriculture was a good example of this. A group
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of young intellectuals visited the countryside to investigate how to increase the
living standards of peasants.

In 1978, after two years of investigation, they

proposed "responsibility fanning" which designated the household as an unit
responsible for productivity after the household head singed a contract for a piece
of land with the village government. When Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Zhiyang
read this proposal, they implemented it without further discussion.
Because the moderate reformers could not tolerate some points of radical
reform, they launc_hed several campaigns: "anti-bourgeois liberalism" in 1981,
"anti-spiritual pollution" and "socialist civilization" in 1985. All of this exemplified
an acute power struggle between the moderates and the radicals (Harding 1987).
Because political leaders of the two major factions, moderate Chun Yun and the
more radical Deng Xiaoping, had difficulty agreeing, they frequently contradicted
each other. They set the ideological tone, helped shape the agenda, and provided
initiative and discipline for their clients. Both Hu Yaobang's resignation in 1987
and Zhao Zhiyang's removal in 1~89 were the results of power struggles. Those
within the Party who wanted to reform the political structure

were rendered

ineffective. This situation caused the reforms to always be in a state of instability
and change.
There is another example which helps explain why Chinese leaders do not
obey the formal rules and procedures of bureaucracy.

Deng reportedly called

Zhao Zhiyang in for a meeting on price reform in May 1988, and complained that
"our pace has not been fast enough"; "wemust adopt bolder measures; do not be
afraid to take risk"; "do not care about opposition of the moderate reformers".
So, Zhao Zhiyang gave out the order to lift price controls so prices could float
according to supply and demand. But price reform caused serious inflation which
had never occurred before in socialist China. In the first quarter of 1988, price
for nonstaple foods went up by 24.2 percent, with a rise of 48. 7 percent in the
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prices of fresh vegetables (Asian Survey 1989). This brought serious criticism from
the moderate reformers, especially Chun Yun, Yao Yinling, and Li Peng.
Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping was also pressured by the moderate reformers. This
caused Deng to complain, "I would not vouch for anyone.

If the situation

continues to deteriorate, I will have to have Zhao dismissed". The dysfunctional
consequences of price reform became a prelude to Zhao's removal. After that
time, the Chinese reform movement almost reversed itself.

The moderate

reformers started to make conservative policy. So, Chun Yun wrote:
"No one alone will be able to secure power. Only by forming
factions can people secure their power and positions. As a result,
there naturally are parties outside the Party, and factions within the
Party. No faction dares to be careless in dealing with other
factions, and they would rather suspect others than believe in them.
This is the way they treat other factions, and do not they do the
same to comrades of their own faction? Everyone feels insecure
and is on guard all the time." (Chun Yun 1980, p. 83).
The seriousness of these power struggles made the achievement of
rational-legal authority. very difficult. The Chinese leaders did not care about
existing rules or regulations, they only depended on their personal judgment and
behavior. These factors were a major obstacle to the realization of an efficient
bureaucracy.
2.

Ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries
Ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries reflect a situation in which

governmental goals and procedures are not spelled out and the level of
productivity stays low. Administration remains relatively unspecialized. Although
Chinese bureaucracy has expanded much more in the past decade than in any
other period of Chinese history, there is no stable specialized division of function,
and the top leaders often bypass the processes of bureaucracy in order to make
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policy decisions peremptorily.
We can examine the low degree of specialization from three aspects as
follows:
First, there is no clearly specialized division between the Party, the
government, and the military. Their structures overlap each other and form many
interlocking organizations.

At the beginning of the 1950's, the Party gradually

took over daily administration which should have been performed by the
government. The Party usurps the functions of the various levels of government
even now, (although the Chinese leaders advocated a separation between them
after 1978).

The Party dominates everything, not only at the upper level

leadership but also at low levels. Second, overlapping governmental organization
lacks an institutionalized division of labor and cooperation. Sometimes, officials
of many central commissions or ministries and local organizations pose the
question: where is the power (the means to make some decision and perform it)?
Actually, they all hold some power, but each lacks the ability to make the policy
decisions. I think this situation reflects a low level of coordination. The lack of
coordination shows in three ways: (1) The different commissions and ministries
constantly wrangle with each other and always make contradictory policies. (2)
No commission or ministry can make any important policies independently, they
must negotiate with others repeatingly before making any decisions; (3) since all
reform policies must consider the benefit of all commissions or ministries, it is
very difficult to make a comprehensive reform policy.
Third, the top leaders frequently circumvent rules and regulations to make
personal decisions about policy. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were
instinctively opposed to bureaucracy (although Deng advocated some rational
reform close to the ideal-type).

They feared bureaucracy because it could

constrain their individual supreme power. Thus, they made decisions through
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their assistants or clients. The reform policy of "Opening 14 Special Economic
Zones" was decided suddenly after Deng Xiaoping visited the ShengZheng
(Guangdong province) in 1985. It was not deliberated on by various government
departments that would be affected.

Instead it was put into effect directly

through the office of Deng.
The lack of specialization and cooperation in both the Chinese Party and
the government leads to irresponsibility. The overlapping functions has promoted
organizational expansion that appears uncontrollable. The Chinese Party and the
government have tried again and again to cut back on the proliferation of
government offices. They proposed a "revolutionary, youthful, knowledgeable,
and specialized" approach to government to replace "timidity, inertia and
obstructionism".

But they always fell into a vicious cycle of "simplifying--

expanding--resimplifying--reexpanding". The first retrenchment was in 1958, when
they decreased the commissions and ministries from 82 to 60. By 1965, the
number had grown to more than 80 again. In 1970, the second retrenchment
occurred, cutting back to 33 organizations, but in 1981 the number had expanded
to 98. In 1982, the third retrenchment resulted in a reduction to 56, but in 1988,
it reexpanded to 98 again.

J.,_

A fragmented, segmented and stratified system
China shows another feature of an industrializing agrarian polity: a lack

of coordination between the central authority and local administration.

Below

the apex, the Chinese system consists of a bewildering number of national
agencies, as well as provincial and local units (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986).
So the process of realizing government policy is very scattered, and local
governments have considerable de facto autonomy.

Since they are assigned

abundant resources and specific permission, they have such strong self-reliance
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that they can become careless and distort the policy coming from the central
government in Beijing. Along with political economic reform, local governments
have received even more authority, such as control of their budgets, taxes,
materials, etc. Although every province and city should carry out the policy of
the central government, the relationship between them is not institutionalized.
Many important policies are put into effect largely through an informal system
of consultation

and compromise,

quite

independently

of organizational

procedures.
In this situation, the relationship between the central government and local
government is in confusion. Whether or not to completely follow the central
policy becomes a recurrent question.

The central government sometimes

attempts to recentralize the power which had been given to the localities. But
as soon as the central government does this, officials of almost every province
complain that when the policy was tightened, it was difficult to complete the kinds
of plans which the central government asked of them; then the central
government has to decentralize its authority again. The abnormal relationship
between levels of government created another vicious cycle: centralism leads to
rigidity, rigidity leads to complaints, complaints lead to decentralization,
decentralizations leads to disorder, and disorder leads back to centralization
(Jiang Yiwei. See Gorden White 1983). Deng Xiaoping spoke to this problem
when he said: "since we can delegate power, we can also retrieve it any time we
like". The Chinese leaders are wary of too much centralization fearing it would
dampen the enthusiasm of the localities; but if they decentralize authority, it
would cause localism and confusion. It is difficult to resolve such contradictions.
The confused relationship between the central and local governments has
two aspects. The first is that the "contradiction between central policy directives
and specific local requirements as well as the 'leaky' quality of power in a
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complex hierarchy have led to informal decentralization within the Party and
government, notably the phenomenon of 'independent kingdoms' under the local
party" (Harding 1987, p. 37). As a matter of fact, local Party and government
officials always alter central policy in accordance with their own interests.
Sometimes they twisted their execution of the central policy for their own benefit.
Guangdong province ,is a good example of this. It not only applied the "reform
and open to the rest of the world" concept to all fields of political economy
completely and flexibly, but also refused some central policies which were not
suited to the situation of Guangdong province.
The second is the ubiquitous "bargaining" phenomenon in the Chinese
government.

These bargains are generally negotiated among commissions or

ministries to serve both administrative and personal objectives. According to my
experience (I was at the Foreign Exchange Administration of the People's Bank
of the Central Government with my president to bargain the business scope of
our corporation), 1· found that no one strictly obeys the regulations. Actually the
higher the position of the official, the less likely he is to obey. In the bargaining
process, GuanXi is most important.

That is, if you offer me (a higher level

person) special assistance, I will offer you special favors in return. We had good
GuanXi with the head of the Foreign Exchange Bureau, so we got a broad range
of business. Especially, we got permission to borrow foreign currency from the
international money market.

This is the result of bargaining for privileges.

Because if we did not have good GuanXi with them, we could not have gotten
the right to borrow foreign currency from abroad directly.

Of course, in the

process of bargaining, bribes and corruption easily arise.
Between the localities (provinces, directed cities, special economic zones)
and the central government, there is always bargaining for privilege regarding
policies that include all kinds of annual plans, budgets, and revenues.

The
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success of bargaining for each province depends on its local government's
economic wealth, geographic factors, and the special relationship with the top
leaders. Guangdong, Fujfan and the special economic zones have gotten many
privileges through the bargaining procedure.

This is why you hear people in

China say: "If the central government gave us these privileges, we could be
successful just like Guangdong province." Whether or not bargaining is successful
becomes a critical factor for local and regional economic development.
The central. government actually loses the power to implement sound
policy, thereby causing an unstable and changeable policy. To give an example,
the central government in Beijing had a policy of strictly controlling investment
in basic construction.

But there existed the bargaining for privileges, because

local governments did not like such strict control. This caused many duplicated
investments and brought about huge financial waste. to tlie country. The central
government also wanted to control the foreign currency available to each
province and control the importing of advanced technology and machinery. But
each province wanted to import products according to their own desire. They
ignored the "whole" situation of China, and they only paid attention to their own
interests.

That has caused a serious situation today. From the beginning of

reform in 1978 to 1991, there were more than one hundred assembly plants
producing color televisions of various brands in China (every province has three
or five factories, all imported to the U. S. A., Japan or West Germany). Each
assembly plant requires foreign currency to import materials and spare parts. But
foreign currency is very scarce in China. So it is impossible to satisfy the needs
of all the plants. Many of them have become idle while a lot of foreign currency
was wasted.
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4.

Results of top-down development
A fourth problem is top-down development. It is obvious that when the

Communist Party established the People Republic of China, Mao Zedong came
to place the struggle for people's hearts and minds ahead of the struggle to
transform the economy (Lenski et al. 1991). The Party and government have
always emphasized that they represent, to the utmost, the interests of the Chinese
people. That is to say, the will of the Party is also the people's will. They usually
indoctrinated the Chinese people to accept the Party's programs through many
kinds of propaganda. But this communication had only one direction: from the
top-down. Elites made development plans or policies according to their own
political view, not in accordance with the people's interests. They did not care
about what the people thought. They completely ignored the varied interests of
the people.

This situation was like Perrow's (1986) criticism of the Classical

Management Theory where supervisors or managers only considered employees
as tools or parts of machinery, and they were never to be given consideration
(even though they finally did get some care, because employers needed them to
keep production going). In China, the Chinese people became a tool or victim
of the power struggles. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution
clearly showed this.
Under these circumstances, illustrated above, on one hand, people do not
understand what the Party wants to do, and on the other hand, people only care
about themselves.

Sometimes, the policy of the Party and government was

misunderstood and "twisted". People did not want to become victims of mass
movements, like the Great Leap Forward and the Culture Revolution.

This

caused many policies to be given up halfway. People did not believe in the Party
and the government. Also, some people always adopted an opportunistic attitude
toward the policies of the Party. Meanwhile most of people took advantage of
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patronage to protect themselves. The patronage relationship always makes it easy
to bring about factionism that prevents realization of policy. Therefore, it is
hardly possible to fully perform the policy.
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Summary

The Chinese Communist Party attempted to rid the people of feudal
consciousness after they took national power, but ironically in many ways they
only intensified it: (1) The power of the Party surpasses any rule of law and the
constitution. No one can constrain its absolute power. This is just like imperial
polity inc Chinese history. (2) The privilege of the Party fosters the development
of patrimonial relations--patronage, 'GuanXi' and 'bargaining'. 'Going the back
door' became universal. The privilege of the Party causes corruption to become
a serious problem in itself. (3) Abuse of power to further personal interests
divorces the leaders from the masses. Inefficiency and irresponsibility become
part of the privilege of the Party elite. All of these critically prevent the Chinese
government from approaching Weber's ideal type of rational-legal authority which
is based on functional efficiency, impersonal performance of duties, and a
coordinated and flexible hierarchical structure.
Thus, there are many obstacles to the Chinese Party and the government
realizing Weber's ideal-type rational-legal authority.

In this chapter I have

discussed (1) personalized rule and acute political struggles, (2) ambiguous
functions and overlapping ministries, (3) a fragmented, segmented, and stratified
system, and (4) the abnormal result of top-down development.

However, the

deeper underlying cause, as Lenski et al. suggest, is the persistence of an agrarian
technological base well into the post-Revolutionary period.
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Part m China After Mao
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Chapter 6 Deng's Political Economic Reforms

When Mao died in 1976, Chinese political and economic structure was
almost on the brink of collapse.

Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader after

Mao, proposed a policy of "reform and openness to the outside world" and
emphasized the gradual establishment of more open and flexible national
economy with modem technology and advanced management.

Other higher

leaders of post-Maoist China also recognized the present political economic
structure that hindered Chinese modernization. Former Premier Zhao Zhiyang
noted that: "China's existing political structure was born out of the war years,
basically established in the period of social transformation and developed in the
course of large-scale mass movements and incessantly intensifying mandatory
planning .. .it fails to suit economic, political and cultural modernization under
peacetime conditions or the development of a socialist commodity economy"
(Zhao Zhiyang 1986).
China has made great strides in the economic field since Deng's dramatic
reform policies were inaugurated in 1978. Hary Harding calls this 'the Chinese
second revolution' (1987). Deng Xiaoping once remarked that "the purpose of
socialism is to make the country rich and strong" (New York Times, Dec. 30,
1980). The regime of Deng Xiaoping has not only accommodated China to the
world capitalist market but accommodated

itself to China's existing social

structure, even while attempting to rationalize and 'modernize' it (Meisner 1989).
Thus, Deng has said "what is good enough for capitalism, evidently, is good
enough for socialism" (emphasizing the economic field) (Beijing Review, Sep. 13,
1987). A cornerstone of Deng's policy has been greater emphasis on market
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mechanisms and less emphasis on centralized economic planning.

L

China's progress under Deng
During the 1980's, China's relative growth in economic output has

outperformed the industrial countries and the world as a whole (Table 13). The
rural population of China for the first time decreased to 48.3 percent in 1989
(See P 32 table 10). This reflects a shift toward greater industrial employment.
The labor force employed in industry and the service sector increased 119 percent
between 1981 and 1989 (Business China 1990). This is important evidence of the
trend toward industrial society. Industrial output increased throughout the 1980s
(Table 14). Meanwhile, the Chinese people's living standard has also improved
(Table 15).
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Table 13: Growth of World Output (Industry and Agriculture) 1981-1988:
China Compared with Other Groups of Countries
(Percentage Change, per Year)
Average per Year
19811986

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

China

8.8

12.0

12.3

7.0

7.0

7.0

Worldwide

2.7

4.S

3.4

3.0

3.2

2.7

Developing
countries

LS

2.2

2.0

2.S

2.7

3.8

Developed
market

2.2

4.7

2.9

2.4

2.6

3.0

In N.America

2.4

6.4

2.8

2.6

2.7

3.4

In W.Europe

LS

2.4

2.3

2.4

2.4

2.4

Japan

3.6

S.1

4.S

2.S

2.6

3.0

Centrally
planned

3.3

3.8

3.6

4.3

4.1

4.S

economies

economies

(Europe)
Source: Adapted from United Nations, 1987 World Economic Survey 1987: Current Trends and
Policies in the World Economyy (New York: United Nations), P 13, Table 11.L (See Smith,
Christopher J. 1990).
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Table 14. Output of Selected Major Industrial (Consumer) Products,
China, 1979, 1983, 1987
1979

Chemical fibers
(10,000 tons)
Machine-made paper
(10,000 tons)
Synthetic detergents
(10,000 tons)

32.6

493

32.4

1983

54.1

661

67.7

1987

117.5

1,141

119.2

1987 as a
% of 1979
+360

+229

+370

Bicycles
(10,000)

1,009

2,758

4,117

+408

Wristwatches (10,000)

1,750

3,478

6,159

+349

Canned food
(10,000 tons)

50.1

84.5

161.5

Beer (10,000 tons)

52

163

540

+1,038

1,938

2,881

+216

Cigarettes (10,000 case) 1,303

+322

Source: adapt~ from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 112. ( China: Statistical Yearbook 1988)
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Table 15. Ownership of Selected Consumer Durable Goods
(1978, 1982, and 1987)
No. Owned per 100
persons
<Whole of China)

Sewing machines
Wristwatches
Bicycles
Radios
Television sets

1978

1982

1987

3.5
8.5
7.7
7.8
0.3

6.6
18.8
13.1
18.2
2.7

11.0
42.8
27.1

24.1
10.7

Source: Adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 169 and China Statistical
Yearbook 1988.

Deng's refonn policy moved forward on two major directions: (1) The first
of these was the decentralization of administrative power and economic decisionmaking.

In a series of stages, greater autonomy was granted to regional

authorities as well as to individual enterprises.

(2) Market principles were

introduced into the socialist command economy.

Privately owned industrial

enterprises were encouraged to develop in the economy (Table 16). These issues
will be observed in the following section.
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Table 16. The Increase of Privately Owned Industrial Enterprises and Percentage of Total Gross Output Value,
1985-1987
1986

1985

% of
Total No.
State enterprises
Collective

% of Total

Output Value

1.81

64.9

33.60

32.1

64.60
6.40
58.20

1.8

% of
Total No.
1.44

1987

% of Total
Output Value

% of
Total No.

% of Total
Output Value

62.3

1.31

59.7

27.2

33.5

24.30

34.6

71.30
5.50
65.80

2.8

74.30
6.60
67.70

3.6

enterprises
Private
enterprises
In cities and town
In rural areas

Source: Adapted from Christopher ·1. Smith, 1991 ( China Statistical Yearbook 1988)
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2.

Political economic reform in China
After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party set up a central, hierarchial

administrative structure. All power and authority of the state was in the hands of
the central government with the National People's Congress serving as the highest
organ of the state authority, and the State Council serving as its executive organ.
Under

the

Council,

there

were

appropriately

one

hundred

ministries,

commissions, general bureaus, and many special agencies. The second level of
the administration includes thirty-one provinces, five autonomous districts, three
centrally administrated cities, and 14 special economic zones (Before 1978, there
were no Special Economic Zones.)

All policies were made by the central

committee and the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.
development was centrally planed.

Economic

Power was overcentralized and relations

between the Party and the government were ambiguous.

The Party's intrusion

into political, economic and social life became a serious obstacle to developing
the national economy.
The Chinese Communist Party leaders, Deng Xiaoping and other veteran
officials considered it critical to change the economic structure. Since the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1978,
a complex political economic reform has been underway. The regime established
new policies designed to foster rapid economic development. These policies well
known by now: reprivatization of the economy; increased material incentives to
encourage labor productivity; attacking of egalitarian practices that interfered
with economic efficiency; political relaxation to mobilize support for the regime;
and professional, economic, and intellectual exchange with the advanced capitalist
countries. These changes resulted in a shift to a more individualized conception
of economic organization and activity (Dirlik 1989).
Under Deng, the Party attempted to inaugurate a new era of relationship
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with

the

governmental

administration.

Functional

specialization

and

organizational separation were stressed, and the previous tendency of the Party
to exercise direct supervision over government activities has been criticized.
Decentralized decision making was extended to localities, basic level production
units, and enterprises (White 1984).
The policy can be summarized in several propositions: enterprise should
be given initiative. and authority over production planning; prices should be
adjusted to accurately reflect a balance between supply and demand; regions
should be encouraged to specialize in those products for which they possess a
comparative

advantage;

and

economic

levers

should

gradually

replace

administrative orders as the mechanisms for state regulation of the economy (Hu
Qiamu 1978). As evidence of the success of this policy, China's economy has
posted an annual average increase of 9 percent since 1978. More evidence of the
success of Deng's pragmatism can be seen by looking at the economic
achievement of Guangdong province.

:i,_

The relationship between decentralization and economic achievement in
Guangdong Province
Guangdong province has a unique advantage because of its coastline of

2,400 kilometers and its proximity to the seaport of Hong Kong. Guangdong is
not like Liangning and Sichuan provinces which have massive industrial bases,
abundant resources and a huge investment from the central government during
1960's and 1970's. As a consequence, Guangdong has been permitted greater
independence and autonomy than many of the other provinces, especially the
internal provinces. Thus, Guangdong leaped ahead of the internal provinces. It
was able to make many reforms on its own, such as a low corporation tax (15
percent), tax holidays, inexpensive land and services, greater freedom in labor
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management, and ·increased access to a market economy.

The governors of

Guangdong (Ren Zhongyi, Ye Xuanping) directed the reform adopting the
following guidelines: "If something is not explicitly prohibited, then move ahead"
and "if something is allowed, then use it to the hilt" (See Vegol 1989, p. 81).
Fortunately, Guangdong was not much affected by the attack on "bourgeois
liberalization" in 1980, the campaign against "spiritual pollution" in the ideological
and cultural spheres in 1980, and the crackdown on corruption in 1985. Even
though in 1987, the central government tried to slow economic growth
nationwide, it appears that the theme was "business as usual" in Guangdong.
Officials in the province and lower level officials seemed set on continuing the
province's high level of growth. With Guangdong province's supply of local
capital and economic and political savvy, the central government in Beijing had
difficulty enforcing its "slow down" policy.
In a little more than 10 years, Guangdong has created an "economic
miracle" that even surpasses Taiwan and Korea. The economy of sixty-million
people (compared to Taiwan's twenty-million and South Korea's .s~venty-two
million) has grown at an average annual rate of 16.5 percent over the ten years,
a growth rate that exceeds Taiwan and Korea (Shirk 1989, p. 919). The GNP of
Guangdong province has already grown to 150 billion RMB in 1989, nearly onetenth of the entire GNP of China (Zhen 1990, pp. 38-9). How did Guangdong
accomplished this "economic miracle" in such a short time?

What were the

foundations of such rapid economic development?
During the Cultural Revolution, the Party and the government were fused
to a very large extent at the provincial level and below. During the reform
movement, a effort was made to separate them. The Party no longer directly
intervenes

in detailed

administrative

matters.

There

is now greater

professionalism in public administration, and administration by technocrats over
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government bureaus, economic enterprises, and grassroots organizations (Harding
1987). Former premier Zhao Ziyang explained the general concept behind
structural reform in his report on the Seventh Five-Year plan, given at the
National People's Congress in April 1986. Zhao said that the Party should no
longer be responsible for "assigning quotas, approving construction projects, and
allotting funds and mandatory planning", and the government bureaucracy should
conduct " overall planning, implement policies, organize coordination, provide
services, use economic means of regulation, and exercise effective inspection and
supervision." (Zhao 1986, See Harding 1987, p. 226). In short, as the economy
was transformed from a centrally planned system into a regulated market, the
function of the government departments had to change as well. Although the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is still at the core of bringing
modernization to China, the Party no longer crudely interferes with economic
development and social life as it did before. The government is increasingly
relying on indirect methods to control economic development. This new system
is helping to replace, to some extent, centralized bureaucratic measures "by the
use of market force and price mechanisms to create a structure in which basiclevel units and individuals are given a much larger measure of autonomy than
before to respond to economic incentives" (Xue Muqiao 1980, p. 7).
In recent years, the government of Guangdong province has significantly
moved toward decentralization. The provincial government began to use macroeconomic levers--prices, taxation, and fiscal policy as indirect methods to
influence development.

Guangdong has not only attracted large financial

investment from abroad and from the internal provinces, but has also reduced the
contradictions between the government and the enterprises which existed in the
internal provinces. These things created an excellent environment for economic
growth.
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Decentralization is a major reason for Guangdong's success. It gives the
local government greater power to enact its own regulations, adopt its own
legislation and adjust the central policy to meet local conditions. Some of the
responsibility for economic planning may also be transferred to the municipal
levels (Harding 1987).

The decentralization of economic management was

implemented by establishing 14 relatively self-reliant economic regions. There
are also five special economic zones in Guangdong Province.
The government of Guangdong not only has greater relative autonomy and
a decentralized allocation of authority from the central government in Beijing, but
also gave its power to the lower counties and productive enterprises.

The

governor recognized that enterprise vitality required greater autonomy and a
change in the direction of the government's role from providing microeconomic
supervision to giving macroeconomic guidelines and increasing the role of the
market. Many enterprises had enough freedom from higher level planning that
even if they were subject to supervision by the local Party and government
officials, they were able to begin responding to new economic opportunities much
as enterprises in the industrial capitalist societies.

Managers were made

responsible for the direction of sales, capital, labor, and materials.

Given

autonomy, the managers of enterprises in Guangdong Province are showing great
initiative.

Their administrative style has been forged by competition in the

market. While pursuing profits, they enhance the wealth of Guangdong Province.
This demonstrates what Adam Smith wrote: " The harmony between individual
self-interest and the goal of the commonwealth

were achieved through

competition" (Heilbroner 1986, p. 161).
In my opinion, decentralization and the idea that 'what is good enough for
capitalism, evidently, is good enough for socialism' are the foundations of the
economic miracle in Guangdong province. After separation between the Party
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and the government, the leaders of Guangdong have successfully divorced the
Party from interlerence in economic affairs · as well. Meanwhile, they have
adopted a comprehensive framework of macro-economic levers to promote
economic development. They have professionalized government administration
and democratized local government. The slogan "To the outside, more open; to
the inside, looser; to those below, more leeway" sums up the policy adopted by
Guangdong Provin_ce.
It is interesting to note that this experiment with economic laissez-faire has
a precedent in Chinese history. The ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao Shi said:"
So long as I 'do nothing', the people will of themselves be transformed; so long
as I love quietude, the people will of themselves go straight; so long as I act only
by inactivity, the people will of themselves become prosperous; so long as I have
no wants the people will of themselves return to the 'state of the uncarved block'
(Lao Zhi 1968, p. 211, See Waley). He also said: "Does nothing, yet achieves
everything" (Lao Zhi 1968, p. 200, See Waley).

That .is not to say that the

government does not care about the development of- the society at all, but _the
government refrains.
from interlering with the freedom of
people and economic
.
.
development.
The central government . gives localities and people enough
-

autonomy to promote economic development and social progress.
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Summary

In a little more than ten years, the structure of Guangdong's political
economy has experienced great change.

The people, the entei:prises, the

govermnent and the Party, all agree that the first step is to develop the economy,
thereby raising the living standard.
pragmatism.

The situation is a result of Deng's

But Guangdong's economic achievement like the rest of China's

economic reform has beert counter-balanced by Deng's ideological conservatism.
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Chapter 7 Persistence of a Dominant Ideology

Lenski et al. state, "Today, in all but the most backward parts of the
industrializing agrarian world, there is an intellectual ferment and a clash of ideas
between the advocates of traditional belief systems and the proponents of newer
ones. The situation is often extremely complicated, because both traditionalists
and modernizers differ among themselves on many points, while others favor
various blends of the old and the new" (1991, p. 381). This situation is found in
present-day China. Deng's goal has not been to create a revolutionary society
(like Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution), but to achieve a "pragmatic
adjustment of revolution to the demands of present reality" (Dirlik and Meisner
1989, p. 7). Deng's pragmatic economic reform is different from Mao's utopian
social revolution. Deng represented the Chinese pragmatic leaders in the postMao era and did not believe in Mao's 'class struggle' and his personality cult. On
the contrary, Deng proposed to repair the damage of thirty years of 'class
struggle'. Deng wanted to get on with the task of national development but this
required an ideology that would preserve political stability.

L.

Conservative ideology in post-Maoist China
For Gramsci (and many other Marxists), a major source of domination

rests in the process of ideological hegemony in addition to ownership of the
means of production. The keys to success are ideological as well as economic.
To achieve ideological hegemony, the leaders of a historical bloc must develop
a universal view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society,
and they must be able to claim with plausibility that their particular interests are
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those of society at large. In fact, hegemony on "a massive scale, is bound to be
uneven in the degree of legitimacy it commands and to leave some room for
antagonistic cultural expressions to develop" (Adamson 1973, p. 5).
When the Party under Deng performed political economic reform, it never
forgot to employ the dominant ideology of the 'four principles'. Deng said that
reform must not challenge the 'four principles'. The core of the principles was
the Chinese Comiilunist Party's monopoly of power. Deng claimed that without
the exclusive and unquestioned leadership of his own Party, a country as large,
fractious, and backward as China would crumble into chaos (See Nathan 1990,
p. 2).

Since 1976, the Chinese Communist Party has on a number of occasions
attempted to put the record straight on Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution.
Cynics have referred to such actions (with some justification) as attempts to falsify
or reinterpret history to better fit with the outlook of Post-Maoist China.
Because Mao's ideology of 'class struggle' failed to develop the national economy
and raise living standards, it created widespread disillusionment after the Cultural
Revolution. Thus, the Party communique stated that "the large-scale turbulent
class struggles of a mass character have in the main come to an end" and decreed
that the Party and people should shift their attention to socialist modernization.
From The Third Plenum in December 1978, there came the endorsement of
national discussions on criterion of truth in order to demystify and demythologize
Mao. In the speech of vice-chairman Ye Jianying on September 17, 1979, he
said, "We must oppose the view that advocates class struggle, to say nothing of
creating so-called class struggle out of the void. The basic goal of revolution is
to liberate and develop the social prodm;:tive force, to improve living standards
of the Chinese people" (Beijing Review 1979). The 'four principles' became the
dominant political ideology to go along with pragmatic economic reforms. The
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Party leaders have used these cardinal principles to combat unorthodox ideas.
From 1978 to 1979, there were a series of ideological arguments against
Marxism and Mao Zedong's thought.

The main idea was to use Western

concepts of democracy, freedom and human rights to evaluate the thirty years of
Chinese socialism and to repudiate Maoism completely.

Thus Wei Jingsheng

argued, "The leaders of our nation must be informed that we want to take our
destiny into our own hands. We want no more gods and emperors; no more
saviors of any kind. We want to be masters of our own country .... Democracy,
freedom and happiness are the only gods of modernization.

Without this fifth

modernization, the four others are nothing more than a new-fangled lie" (Quoted
in G. Barme and J. Minford ed. 1986, p. 227).
According to this opinion, socialism had failed in China. The Party and
its leaders had reimposed a feudalist totalitarianism, just like the imperial
emperor in Chinese history. If the Chinese people wished to modernize, they
must first establish democracy and modernize China's social system. Without
democracy society would sink into stagnation, and economic growth would
encounter insurmountable obstacles. The people should share the power with the
Party and end the monopoly of communist control. In a word, everything was
bad in socialist China. Only democracy, freedom and human rights could save
China. The whole society was undergoing a 'crisis of faith'. Some people began
to doubt the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninism, and Mao
Zedong's thought was bitterly attacked.
With the Party's hegemony in peril, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the 'four
principles' to guide the country in March 1979. The 'four principles' refer to (1)
upholding the socialist road, (2) the dictatorship of the people's democracy, (3)
the leadership of the communist Party, and (4) the guidance of Marxism-Leninism
and Mao Zedong's thought. The aim of advocating the 'four principles' was to
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ask people to obey them, thereby preventing them from being affected by any
oppositional ideas. Meanwhile the Party used the principle of the 'dictatorship
of the people's democracy' to arrest Wei Jinsheng and others who were accused
of violating the Chinese Constitution by propagating anti-socialist thoughts.
Democracy and freedom, according to the Party, could only come from the 'four
principles' .
2.

The dominant ideology of the 'four principles'
The 'four principles' summarize the dominant political ideology in post-

Maoist China. It will be instructive if we analyze these principles. The Chinese
concept of socialism has two concrete meanings: first, ownership of the means of
production by the state or by collective units; and second, the principle of
distribution according to work and the planned economy. The experiment of
granting autonomy to enterprises and the expansion of the use of the market
mechanism as a supplement to planning point to a loosening of the system of
planned economy. The principle of the dictatorship of the peoples's democracy
is a necessary reaffinnation of the Party's link to Marxism-Leninism. Its main
function is to legitimize the leadership of the Party. The principle of upholding
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thoughts reasserts that_ these ideas are the
backbone of Chinese socialism.
reinterpreted

Alternatively, these principles can all be

under the formula of integrating "the universal principles of

Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

thought

with the concrete

practice

of socialist

mo~ernization and develop it under the new historical conditions" (Beijing
Review, Dec. 29, 1978).
Undoubtedly, the leadership of the Party is the "most basic of the 'four
principles", as Deng Xiaoping emphasized on January 1, 1980. (Remnin Ribao,
January 1, 1980, p. 1). The theme of the Fifth Plenum held in February 1980 was

95
to strengthen and improve the leadership of the Party, thereby strengthening the
'monistic center of power' in the society. What this meant was that all power and
authority of the state should be firmly controlled by the Chinese Communist
Party. Deng Xiaoping said: "Without the Communist Party's leadership there
would definitely be great disorder under heaven and the nation would be tom
apart by disunity. This has been verified by the Chinese history .... Without the
Party's leadership there will be no socialist system" (Deng Xiaoping 1985,p. 369).
Ironically, this agrees with Marx's dominant ideology thesis: the idea that
the dominant class needs to sustain legitimacy through claiming to represent the
interests of the society as a whole becomes a central feature of political discourse
(Giddens 1979). So we can see how important it is to the Party to hold fast to
the 'four principles', which are written into the Chinese Constitution.
Meanwhile,

the

Party

used

its

control

of education,

culture,

communications media, and the like to propagandize the 'four principles'. In fact,
Western-style democracy and freedom do not fit the Chinese national conditions
(Quoqing), because there is no concept of democracy in traditional Chinese
culture. In several thousand years of Chinese history, there was no democratic
system like that of ancient Greece. China, a huge society that is only beginning
to threw off its agrarian legacy, has more than 1 billion people, eighty percent of
whom are peasant. Most of them have no conception of democracy whatsoever.
That is why Deng has often argued and pointed out that China's national
condition--a code word for backwardness--does not allow the country to have as
much democracy as Western states.

"In our situation today," he said in 1979,

explaining why China must adhere to the 'four principles', "we must do things in
accordance

with Chinese

conditions

and find a Chinese-style path to

modernization. Departure from the 'four principles' and talk about democracy in
the abstract will inevitably lead to the unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and
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anarchism" (Deng .Xiaoping 1989, p. 22). In 1989, when American President
George Bush visited Beijing, Deng told Bush, "Ifwe were to run elections among
China's one billion people now, chaos ... would certainly ensue .... Democracy is our
goal, but the state must maintain stability" (Beijing Review, January 12-22, 1989,

p. 16).
The traditional

Chinese

notion

of the human being emphasized

responsibilities rather than rights. The Chinese have always defmed themselves
in terms of their obligations to society, not in terms of what society and
government owe them. They have never been imbued with the political ideals
of freedom and human rights so characteristic of the bourgeois industrial
democracies.

There were only endless peasant revolutions and rebellions that

went right on throughout Chinese history.
This not to say that the Chinese do not want to be free or endowed with
human rights, but that with the exception of a small stratum of educated
intellectuals, most Chinese believe that to take advantage of individual rights is
to do something selfish. It is in the Chinese cultural heritage to feel that the
mere act of taking these rights somehow taints them with a suggestion of selfindulgence, of putting one's own desires ahead of the interests of the group or
society as a whole. This is both very traditional, in the sense that Confucians
always emphasized controlling selfish feelings with proper forms of selfless
behavior and it is also very Marxist. Deng too has always viewed things from the
standpoint of the good of society as a whole rather than that of the individual.
China is not a society which emphasizes individualism. And so, while some young
intellectuals have talked about democracy and human rights, these are not things
that have come to the Chinese as fundamental aspects of their culture, as they
have in the West.
Another thing I want to explain is that Chinese intellectuals are a very
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small part of China, and it is only in the last few years that most of the younger
generation have begun to have some contact with outside world. Those things
which the more extreme advocates of democracy have been asking for may sound
very familiar to Westerners, but they are quite new to Chinese who may not grasp
the full implications of Western individualist democracy.

The West has the

historical tradition of democracy and human rights that began with Greek
civilization more than two thousand years ago. At that time, the first emperor of
China had established a central authoritarian system. There was no background
of democracy in Chinese cultural history. Most Chinese are used to authoritarian
rule after several thousand years of imperial dynasties.
So, we could say that the young intellectuals who advocate Western
democracy do not understand Chinese history very well. They do not know about
the constraints which an agrarian history lays upon political development.
Actually, the most important thing for China is to develop an strong industrial
economy and raise people's living standards in a stable social environment.
Under these situations, it is possible to develop toward more democracy. Thus
we may better understand Deng's use of the 'four principles'. Otherwise, chaos
and instability will return to China.

1,_

Upholding .the 'four principles' against 'bourgeois liberalization' and
'spiritual pollution'
In the process of promulgating its dominant ideology, the Party launched

a series of campaigns to criticize 'bourgeois liberalization' in 1980-1981, and
'spiritual pollution' in 19 85-19 86, and to crackdown on corruption and 'erroneous
trend of thoughts' in 1987. The aim of these campaigns was to indoctrinate the
'four principles' throughout the society and perhaps more importantly among
intellectual and political elites, because "the dominant ideology is best seen as
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securing the coherence of the dominant class" (Abercrombie and Turner 1978).
In this section I want to analyze what 'spiritual pollution' and 'bourgeois
liberalization' were about.
In 1983-1985, there was a 'trend of thought' which wanted to use
'humanism and alienation' to reinterpret Chinese Marxism. Some intellectuals
who advocated these ideas thought that alienation not only exists in capitalism,
but also in socialist China.

The source of the problem in China was an

'alienation of power'. This was because the existence of organs of state power
implies alienation in the political field. In the socialist state the organs of power
had to be placed above society and to issue orders to their citizens; the 'servants
of the people' must become the 'masters of the people'. Nepotism, favoritism,
and patrimonialism were seen as reflections of this alienation of power. These
thinkers believed that the only way to abolish alienation would be to outlaw the
leadership of the Party and give up socialism. It was ideas of this sort that Deng
referred to as 'spiritual pollution'.
pollution': one was departure

There were two categories of 'spiritual

from Marxist-Leninism and Maoist thought

including so-called 'socialist aberrations'; the other was to promulgate bourgeois
values in order to repudiate the Chinese socialist path.
Meanwhile the Party defined 'bourgeois liberalization' as denying Marxism
completely, denying the Chinese socialist system, propagating

'wholesale

Westernization', following a capitalist path and abolishing the leadership of the
Party. Scientist Fang Lizhi,ideological theorist Wang Rongwang and Liu Binyan
were the main proponents. They argued that the 'four principles' were 'outdated,
rigid, dogmatic concepts and worn-out phrases' that had led China to calamity on
several occasions. They thought that the only way for China to go was to develop
a capitalist 'private enterprise system' and 'wholesale Westernization'. To these
ideas the response of the Party was unambiguous! "No Chinese with pride,
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confidence, and respect for history and fact will ever endorse this idea of
'wholesale Westernization"' (People's Daily, March, 1987, p. 1).
For the Party the only choice was to preclude any other ideologies from
forming an 'effective opposition' which could cause ideological confusion in the
society. So the opposition leaders were expelled from the Chinese Communist
Party. Then the Party used the newspapers, TV. and other media to criticize
them and pointed out, "Fang Lizhi, Wang Rongwang and Liu Binyan have made
a series of extremely erroneous speeches advocating bourgeois liberalization.
They have seriously violated the 'four principles"' (Beijing Review, May 14-23,
1987, p. 12). The aim of the opposition was to instill the idea of bourgeois
liberalism into Chinese society, to sow discord between the Party and the people,
and to incite dissatisfaction with socialism and the Party. Deng Xiaoping said,
"We must have a peaceful, stable social environment to implement the 'reform
and openness to the outside world' policy so as to realize modernization.

We

must not allow any people to propagate 'bourgeois liberalization'. If the trend
of liberalization thought was promulgated pervasively in society, our goal could
not be achieved. In a word, stability and unity of society in China is the first
important thing" (Deng Xiaoping, May, 1985).
In fact, Deng Xiaoping recognized these problems when he advocated the
'reform and openness to the outside world' policy. In January 1980, he gave a
speech in which he said: "I should point out that some infiltration of bourgeois
ideology is inevitable because of the non-socialist ideas that already exist in our
Party and country, the ten-year rampage of 'cultural revolution' and the fact that
we need to develop diplomatic and trade relations with capitalist countries .... that
is why it is necessary to stress repeatedly that we must adhere to the 'four
principles' .... When we study the technology and management experience of
capitalist society, we must never allow ourselves to worship capitalist countries,
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to succumb to corrosive capitalist. influences, or to lose the national pride and
self-confidence of socialist China. We must eradicate resolutely the trend toward
bourgeois liberalization that is emerging within the Party and society" (Deng
Xiaoping, 1980, A Speech in the Fifth Plenum of the Conference of the Party).
From his speech, we see clearly that Deng knew how to wield the dominant
ideology so as to maintain social stability and unity.
During ten years of stability from 1978 to 1988, the Party was pragmatic
in promoting economic modernization and conservative in politics to keep social
order. As a matter of fact, Deng and the Party achieved enormous economic
results. First, in agriculture, Deng disbanded the communes and leased the land
back to the peasant households for private management. This increased the value
of agriculture output as well as gained the support of eighty hundred million
peasants. Second, in commerce and industry, Deng allowed the growth of small
individual and collective factories, stores, and service trades. This private and
semi-private sector has grown rapidly, employs a large portion of the labor force
and produces at least a fifth of China's industrial product (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chubanshe, 1988,p. 287). People's living standards were raised enormously.
Third, Deng opened up the Chinese economy to foreign trade and investment.
So far, over seventy-nine billion US dollars of foreign investment has flowed into
China, and foreign trade now constitutes twenty-eight percent of the GNP
(Beijing Review 32:10, March 6-12, 1989).

All of this has resulted from

developing the national economy in a stable social and political environment.

4.,_

Retrospect: the situation of the Chinese dominant ideology after
June 4th 1989
Although the May-June demonstrations were peaceful and did not seek to

overthrow communism or the ruling Party, Deng labeled them a 'counter-
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revolutionary rebellion' because of their demand for independent

political

organizations and free press. These demands threatened the single party system
(Nathan 1990). So, when some intellectuals wanted to share power with the Party
through propagating the oppositional ideology of 'bourgeois liberalization' and
'wholesale westernization', the Party pointed out that they did not represent
eighty hundred million peasants. If spurred to rebellion, these 'garbage' would
cause chaos. What most Chinese actually want is for the 'reform and openness
to the outside world' policies to continue. They want the society to remain stable
so that they can increase their living standards.
Deng said again: "Ifwe allow demonstrations in China with more than one
billion people, how can we maintain stability? In an unstable country, nothing
could be achieved" (Deng Xiaoping, April 25, 1989 Speech in Beijing, See World
Affair, Vol.152, No.3, 1989-90).

The new General Secretary Jiang Zeming

reiterated 'The June 4th Turmoil' had set out to " .... subvert the socialist system
and ... tum China into a bourgeois republic and an appendage of the big Western
imperialist powers". This would be the result of 'bourgeois liberalization'. So, the
Party called for strengthening and insisting on the 'four principles', especially
building the leadership of the Party at all levels in order to safeguard the socialist
path. Jiang emphasized that it would have been impossible to make the great
advances after 1978 without insisting on the 'four principles'.

'The June 4th

Turmoil' happened in China because the two former General Secretaries did not
give unswerving support to the hegemony of the Party and instead supported
'bourgeois liberalization'. Jiang said that China must uphold the basic principles
of the Party; it should never have permitted the use of the policy of 'reforming
to develop socialist commodity economy' as a cover to propagate capitalist
ideology such as 'democracy, freedom and human-rights'.
As soon as the Tiananmen Massacre was over, the Party began a campaign
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of ideological education in all levels of Chinese society. People were required to
study the speeches of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zeming as well as relevant
articles in People's Daily. They were required to write self-assessment reports
during the Spring of 1989 --with particular emphasis on their behavior (the
important criterion being whether or not they had taken part in the June 4th
Turmoil).

Further appraisals took place at unit or group meetings.

individual cases were examined by higher-level Party authorities.

Finally,

(When I was

in China, I experienced that campaign.) The Chinese Party not only used mass
media to indoctrinate the 'four principles', but also used coercive methods to
purge people's minds and bodies to achieve its aim of hegemony.

And they

stepped up the censorship of all heterodox views (especially bourgeois
liberalization).
The Chinese Party has continued to follow the 'four principles'. Jiang
Zeming made a speech at the meeting of the Central Committee on Oct. 22,
1991. He emphasized the need to continue ideological work in the Party in order
to prevent some of its members (including some high leaders such as Zhao
Zhiyang, Hu Yaobang and others) from straying from the 'four principles'.
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Summary

In the process of industrialization in China, the most important objective
may be to maintain a stable social and political environment and to continue the
policy of 'reform and openness to the outside world' , although this means
continuing conservatism in politics. If the argument of Lenski et al. (1991) is
correct, industrialization will eventually force political liberalization in China.
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, all had one party systems before they
achieved great success in their national economies.

After the economic

foundations were established, they began to adjust and reform their single party
dictatorships and gradually moved toward more democratic societies.

These

countries took a long time to shift away from a despotic political structure to
democracy, and they are still struggling for it. So, it is important and necessary
for China to approach political reform gradually. The comment of the ancient
Chinese philosopher Lao Zhi is appropriate: " Ruling a large kingdom is indeed
like cooking small fish" (Lao Zhi 1963, p. 287, See Aurthur Waley). Change can
only be accomplished with great care, and in small steps.

104
Conclusions.

Technological innovation exerts a strong influence on human societies,
because an advance in the technological base is a necessary precondition for any
substantial growth or development in terms of size, complexity, power, and
wealth. Technology impacts social, political and economic structures; and these
structures, in tum, react on technology and influence its further development
(Lenski et al. 1991). In two thousand years of Chinese history, the technological
base scarcely changed while the imperial polity and Confucianism were equally
persistent. During the twentieth century, China entered the industrial era, but
still technological change came slowly. Thus, even after the 1949 Revolution, the
new polity seemed more like the imperial system it replaced than the government
of an industrialized country.

Mao Zedong became like a new emperor and

Marxist-Leninism tempered with Mao's thought was a new dominant ideology.
In recent decades, however, China has undergone a steady trend toward

industrialization, and this has challenged the traditional agrarian pattern of the
polity. I have sketched this trend in the preceding chapters (see Table 17 for a
summary).
After 10 years of reform--"the second revolution" (Harding 1987)--the
market already plays a huge role in China's economy, with nearly half its
industrial output coming from non-state companies. The challenge Deng has set
is to introduce market principles of competition and efficiency to state enterprises
and thereby to decentralize economic decision making. The results are owing to
the strong pragmatism of the current leaders. Deng Xiaoping expressed it best,
with characteristic conciseness: When some complained that his program of
economic reform was a reintroduction of capitalism, he responded that it does not
matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.
The political elite appears determined to stick with pragmatic policies.
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The present Communist Party Congress of China opened a crucial meeting on
Oct. 12, 1992 by vowing to pursue supreme leader Deng Xiaoping's pragmatist
reform for 100 years. The Party leader said: "We can truly say that we have
begun a new revolution, the objective of which is to fundamentally change the
economic structure that has hampered the development of the productive forces
and to establish a new and vigorous socialist economic structure" (Jiang Zeming,
Oct. 12, 1992).
Due to the world-wide influence of industrialization the most important
political trend in the twentieth century has been the spread of democracy. Lenski
et al. (1991) suggest that as industrializing agrarian societies continue to
modernize their technological base and economy there may be an increasing
movement toward developing more democratic political institutions. This trend
is visible today in Post-Maoist China, although the movement is slow. Political
leaders continue to believe that economic reform can be accomplished without
political liberalization and western-style democracy. The banner of the recent
Party Congress reads "Insist on the Socialist Road under the Guidance ofMarxistLeninist-Maoism with Chinese Characteristics". China's leaders are committed
to rapid economic modernization while they are extremely cautious about
democratization.

But elsewhere in Asia authoritarian regimes have found that

economic growth almost invariably brings about demand for democratization from
emerging middle classes. The calls for political reform and greater democracy
will also increase in China as industrialization continues.
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Table 17. Evolution of the Chinese Political Structure
Imperial China

Maoist China

Post-Maoist China

Prefer:c:ed method of policy implementation

Feared change would
bring chaos
Imperial decrees

Intrusiveness of the state

Completely, totally

Main tasks of governmental
bureaucracy

Maintain legitimacy and
continuation of the dynasty

Continuous revolution to
prevent backsliding
Class struggle, mobilization
Of populace
Totally through 'small group'
rituals
Continual revolution, elimination
of lingering bourgeois influences

Dominant ideology

Confucianism

Maoism

Reform; gradual economic change
under conservative ideology
More pragmatism; autonomy to
provincial and local units
Pursuit of some private interests
and withdrawal tolerated
Changing economic structure toward
socialist market economy, emphasizing efficiency
Deng's 'four principles'

Mechanisms for integrating the polity

Patrominalism
and military
coercion

Networks of personal relations,
coercion

Techniques for controlling political power

Sovereign emperor and
endless political purges

Endless campaigns, purges

Extent of political 'institutionalization'

Very low, rule of men totally

Nature of politics at top level

Struggles between emperor's
in-laws, high literati and
eunuchs
One-man rule
Literati, emperor's inlaw families and eunuchs;
military force

Low, rule of men rather than
institutions
Unbridled factionalism below top
leader

Attribute of the system
How leader(s) view process of change

Rule at top
Dominant organizational hierarchies

One-man rule
Chinese Communist Party
People's Liberation Army
public security

Source: Partially adapted from Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush "China's Political Evolution: 1972-1982".

Networks of personal relations,
partially regularized personnel
system, partial market competition,
coercion
Partial campaigns but to some extent
obey the regularity of a more rationallegal bureaucracy
Still low, but approaching a
modem bureaucracy
Struggles still remain but emphasizing
unity to develop the national economy
Collective leadership, patron-clients
Party committee chain of command,
Propaganda Dept., State planning
Commission, Ministry of Finance, army,
public security forces; provincial and
local government departments

more
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Appendix 1. Definition of Codes (From Tuden and Marshall, 1972)

Police
The following symbols indicate _the degree of specialization

and

institutionalization _of police functions.
o

Police functions are not specialized or institutionalized at any level of
political integration, the maintenance of law and order being left
exclusively to informal mechanisms of social control, to private retaliation,
or to sorcery.

i

There is only incipient specialization, as when groups with other functions
are assigned police functions in emergencies, eg., military societies at a
Plains Indian annual sun dance and buffalo hunt.

r

Police functions are assumed by the retainers of chiefs.

m

Police functions are assumed by the military organization.

s

Police functions are specialized and institutionalized on at least some level
or levels of political integration.

Levels of Sovereignty
The symbols below indicate the level of effective sovereignty, defmed as
the highest level of indigenous political integration at which functionaries have
and commonly exercise the power to enforce important decisions at subordinate
levels in the political structure--notable to compel participation in warfare, to
collect taxes or tribute, and /or to exact sanctions for major delict. Unless at
least one of these powers is found at a particular level, a lack of effective
sovereignty is assumed for that level.
A

Absence of effective sovereignty at any level transcending that of the local
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community, ie., a stateless society.
B

Effective sovereignty occurs at the first (but no higher) level of political
integration above the local community, as in the case of a petty paramount
chief ruling a district composed of a number of local communities.

C

Effective sovereignty occurs at the second (but no higher) level of political
integration above the local community, as in the case of a small state
comprising a number of administrative

districts under subordinate

functionaries.
D

Effective sovereignty is found at the third (or higher) level of political
integration above the local community, as in the case of a large state
divided into administrative provinces which are further subdivided into
lesser administrative districts.

Deliberative and Consultative Bodies
The following symbols indicate the composition of a deliberative body
which exercises or shares supreme decision-making authority at the level of
effective sovereignty, as indicated by C or S of Executive . A bicameral legislature
with different modes of selection is indicated by two letters.
0

Absence of a supreme deliberative body.

A

An aristocratic deliberative body whose membership is hereditary or

otherwise confined to ascribed statuses and is representative primarily of
a ruling class or classes, eg., a council of nobles.
C

A deliberative council whose members are appointed by, but are relatively

independent of, the chief executive, a ruling clique or party, or particularly
designated .electors at the same level of political integration, eg., a
supreme soviet.
R

A deliberative body representative of several or all of the state's major
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class or ethnic components.
E

An elective legislature or parliament chosen independently by the franchise

of a substantial proportion of the free citizenry.

Executive
0

Absence

of effective sovereignty, and

consequently

of executive

functionaries, at any level above that of the local community.
C

Supreme decision-making authority is vested in a council, assembly, or
other deliberative body with no single executive other than at best a
presiding officer.

S

Supreme decision-making authority is shared more or less equally by a
single (or plural) executive and a deliver body, eg., a king, president or
prime minister and a supreme council or parliament.

P

Supreme decision-making authority is vested in a single authoritative
leader, eg., a paramount chief, king, or dictator, however much he may in
fact be influenced by advisors.

Administrative Hierarchy
The following symbols indicate the type of subordinate functionaries who
occupy the most influential statuses at the level of political integration
immediately

below that characterized

by effective sovereignty, and the

relationship of these functionaries to the supreme executive.
A

Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local
community.

P

The principal subordinate functionaries are popular assemblies, councils
of notables, or other plural (rather than individual) statuses which
represent

their constituencies

and enjoy a substantial

measure of
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independence vis-a-vis the supreme executive.
K

The principal subordinate functionaries are heads of component kin groups
rather than of territorial divisions of the state, and owe their positions
primarily to kinship principles.

D

The principal subordinate functionaries are heads of territorial divisions
of the state who enjoy a substantial degree of decentralized independence

vis-a-vis the supreme executive.
S

The principal subordinate functionaries are head of territorial divisions of
the state who are closely supervised by the supreme executive and form
part of a centralized administrative system.

+

A plus following a letter indicates the presence of a deliberative body
which shares authority at this level.

Selection of Subordinate Officials
The following symbols indicate the prevailing mode of succession to the
statuses of the principal subordinate administrative functionaries.
o

Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above , that of the local
community.

p

Patrilineal succession.

m

Matrilineal succession.

h

Hereditary succession within a ruling lineage or other privileged group, the
particular individual choice being determined by some special elective or
appointive procedure.

s

Succession is based primarily on seniority or age/

i

Informal recognition on the basis of personal influence, prestige, or wealth.

e

Formal election by their constituencies.

a

Appointment by the supreme executive.
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Judiciary
The following symbols indicate the locus of supreme judicial jurisdiction
(normally appellate) at the level of effective sovereignty.
0

Supreme judicial authority is lacking at any level above that of the local
community.

L

Supreme judicial· authority exists at a level above that of the local
community but below that of effective sovereignty.

E

Supreme judicial authority is exercised by the supreme executive, eg., the
king is also the supreme judge, the council is also the supreme curt.

I

Supreme juridical authority is vested in a functionary or functionaries who
are appointed by the supreme executive and /or the supreme deliberative
body but are at least relatively independent of the appointing authority.

P

Supreme judicial authority is independent of the political system and is
vested in a priesthood or other primarily religious functionaries.

H

Supreme judicial authority is exercised by independent

hereditary

functionaries.

Advisory Bodies
The following symbols indicate the composition of political bodies or
groups at the same level which have important advisory or consultative functions
but do not have independent or co-ordinate decision-making powers.
o

Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local
community.

n

Absence of a separate consultative body.

r

The principal advisors of the supreme executive are his (or their) close
relatives, eg., members of the royal family or lineage.

f

The principal advisors are a coterie of personal favorites of the supreme
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executive (or of influential council members), among whom neither close
relatives nor sodality mates predominate, eg., royal courtiers, a 'kitchen
cabinet'.
s

The principal advisors are members of a secret society, cult group, agegrade, or other sodality.

y

The advisory body is composed of representatives of subordinate groups.

z

The consultative body is otherwise constituted,

eg., composed of

individuals with hereditary status.
a

The principal advisors are administrative functionaries, eg. , the heads of
administrative departments, a president's or prime minister's cabinet.

Selection of Executive
The following symbols indicate the mode of selection of supreme executive
functionaries other than members of an authoritative council or deliberative body.
o

Absence

of effective sovereignty, and consequently

of executive

functionaries at any level above that of the local community.
p

Succession is hereditary and patrilineal, normally from father to son.

q

The same except that a brother takes precedence over a son.

m

Succession is hereditary and matrilineal, normally from Mobr to SiSo.

n

The same except that a brother takes precedence over a nephew.

f

Succession is hereditary within a ruling family (or group of families), the
choice among potential heirs being made by the family, the predecessor,
a council, or special functionaries with electoral powers.

1

Succession is nonhereditary and is determined by a body of limited size,
eg., a ruling clique, a particular political party, or a small body of
designated elector. This symbol is to be used instead of e when elections
are merely a stereotyped confirmation of the decision of a limited power
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group.
c

The single (or plural) executive is elected or otherwise chosen by a council
or other deliberative body. In the absence of such an executive, the same
symbol can be employed for the presiding officer of the supreme council.

i

Succession ·is through informal recognition on the basis of personal
qualifications.

e

Succession is nonhereditary but a formal electoral procedure which is
participated in by a substantial proportion of the free citizenry.

a

The single (or plural) executive is an appointee of a dominant alien
society, eg., a colonial power.

s

The succession is determined primarily by supernatural
divination.

means, eg.,
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Appendix 3: Code Book

CROSS-CULTURAL CODES (SCCS)
POLICE

POLICE
o=0

LEVSOV

i=l

S=5

JUDI

SELEXECl

L=4

P=3

K=2 D=3 D+=4

SELECTION OF SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS
o=0

p=l

m=2 h=3

e=6

a=7

ah=8

s=4

i=5

P=4

H=5

JUDICIARY
E=2 1=3

HIGHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
o=0

ABODl

S=2

S+=6

O=0 L=l
HPOl

E=4

ADMINISTRATIVE IIlERARCHY
A=0 P=l

SELSUBO

C=2 R=3

EXECUTIVE
O=0 C=l

ADIIlER

C=2 D=3

DELIBERATIVE AND CONSULATIVE BODIES
O=0 A=l

EXEC

m=3 s=4

LEVELS OF SOVEREIGNTY
A=0 B=l

DCBODl

r=2

p=l

a=2

c=3

i=4

f=3

s=4

ADVISORY BODIES
o=0

n=l

z=6

a=7

r=2

y=5

SELECTION OF EXECUTIVE
o=0

p=l

q=2

m=3 m=4 f=5

1=6

c=7

i=8

e=9

a=lO s=ll

